The knowledgeable rebel

The knowledgeable rebel
Unedited version

In Weber’s science as a ‘vocation’ (Beruf), prominence has been given to an ‘inward calling ’ that involves a passionate pursuit and devotion to the making of a conjecture that the fate of one’s soul depends upon . I have structured this thesis to advent and to prove in the end, only one conjecture – that the nature of social reality is ‘socially constructed.’ All social scientists in writing, must play the role the knowledgeable rebel. In book VII section 7 of Plato’s Republic, Plato uses the simile of the cave to preclude two orders of reality or the distinction between knowledge (episteme) – Forms or what is ultimately real; what is ultimately unchanging; what is the ultimate reality and opinion (doxa) - or what only appears to be to our senses . In this cave, prisoners are fettered by chains with faces turned towards the frontal walls of the caves. Prisoners are accustomed to only shadowy images on the wall that a light source or the sun projects . Plato’s philosopher ruler is the knowledgeable rebel, whose dutiful role is to lead only those who are willing, to see the sun, the light source or the true ontology of reality.

Many Philosopher thinkers, sociologists, literary writers have taken up this role although I think it is not as much to rebel against current order, but to put reality back into its original state of “ad infinitum possibilities.” Where Kant has posited a framework of the unconditional transcendental philosophy or the must be a priori transcendental subjectivity , the ‘I am ,’ Foucault has inversed it and showed the empirical source of Kant’s must be universal transcendental system. Foucault was able to show how Kant’s Anthropology is a wholesale evidence of the Critique of Pure Reason’s empiricity in Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology. Similarly, the whole project of Frankfurt school thinkers such as Adorno, found it necessary in his negative dialectics to “undermine the already tottering frame of bourgeois idealism by exposing the contradictions which riddled its categories and following their inherent logic push them to the point where categories were made to self destruct. ” Adorno fought to show the flipside and hence reversibility of things. Where proletariat thought that the bourgeosie social structure is the whole, eternally valid order of social reality he is in, Adorno’s negative dialectics sought to show that the bourgeosie order is not the absolute but only a particular actualized moment within the seemingly necessary and categorically imperative historical process. Adorno through his critical inquiry sought to isolate the particular actually existing reality from the illusion of its seemingly must be; necessary state by giving recognition to its other possible states. Adorno terms these ‘other possible states’ as the particular’s nonidentity or what Ernest Bloch would call, recognition of the “not-yet-existing” (Noch-nicht-seiende) . In this light, Foucault’s works on the history of sexuality problematizing the subject, sexuality and the ethics of morality since the fourth and fifth century can be considered as a negative dialectic all aimed at raising contradictions, antimonies and paradoxes. The knowledgeable rebel realizes that all these dialectical images or historical images are but a very created form of nature and created by whom but the subject? This is what the knowledgeable rebel wants to illuminate.

As Adorno writes in his inaugural lecture in 1931,

“These images are not simply self-given. They do not lie organically ready in history; no gaze [Schau] and no intuition are required to be aware of them; they are not magically sent by gods to be taken in and venerated. Rather, they must be produced by human beings… ”

Immanuel Kant as well wrote in his 2nd Critique of the power of Judgment that there are no natural ends inherent and natural in itself.

“An organized product of nature is that in which everything is an end and reciprocally a means as well. Nothing in it is in vain, purposeless, or to be ascribed to a blind mechanism of nature. Pp. 248”

That we see a certain order in things, is not because the order exists “natural” in itself and by itself as like an unchangeable law. “Matter is [only a] a multitude of things, which by itself can provide no determinate unity of composition pp 248.” The ultimate causal link that provides this ultimate unity in a way “give it its lifeline,” its connection is man, the subject, or the individual in his reflecting power of judgment . The first presupposition of the knowledgeable rebel is hence that the subject is primary. By this, she means that the subject is the most fundamental and irreducible unit of society. Only when we take the subject as the most fundamental unit of social scientific analysis can we reconcile fact that society is replete with manifold contradictions, paradoxes and antinomies because society is made up of many sorts of subjects who can think i.e. act reflexively and act or will within a certain social space .

The knowledgeable rebel’s role is not to assert the particular truth of anything. She does not stop at showing the dialectical counter-side of a truth. But to push it further and to offer her own subjective intepretation of her sociality which will bring social reality back to what it really is – for everyone and especially for all who have been decried as deviant criminals, there is a need to give them a neutrality in their subverted identities as – free spirits . To do this, she has taken on the role of the knowledgeable rebel in this thesis to valiantly make a claim to what is the universal and ultimate essence of social reality. Yet, even if the analysis falls short, the motive and beruf of this rebel to return to the individual, the reflexivity, power or possibility of his or her acting by virtue of alluding to the inconsistencies in the problematic order of normalcy; to question the basis of its very legitimacy; to raise critical inquiries into the naturalness of social life; to invert the moral values of society ; to give consciousness of the taken-for-grantedness in daily life .

“The role of the intellectual […] is through the analyses that he carries out in his own field, to question over and over again what is postulated as self-evident, to disturb people’s mental habits, the way they do and think things, to dissipate what is familiar and accepted, to reexamine rules and institutions…” [Foucault, Lectures. The Concern for Truth pp. 265]

Notes:
(These do not have proper notations as in the original document form in my hard-drive. For a better discussion, I may provide them but since this is only for storage purposes, I am not caring too much).


Pp 5. Of Max Weber “Science as a vocation” Wissenschaft als Beruf from Gessamlte Aufsaetze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tubingen 1922 pp. 524-55 Originally delivered as a speech at Munich University 1918. Published in 1919 by Duncker & Humboldt, Munich

I am here presupposing here the impossibility of a ‘disinterested social scientific judgment’ for in writing this paper, I have been motivated by multiple inextricably connected motivations, passions and devotions. I am not claiming the universality or correctness of my conjecture, but that this is my conjecture.
“…whoever lacks the capacity to put on blinders so to speak, and to come up to the idea that the fate of his soul depends upon whether he makes the correct conjecture at this passage of this manuscript may as well stay from science. He will never have what one may call the ‘personal experience of science. Without this strange intoxication, ridiculed by every outsider; without this passion, ‘thousands of years must pass before you enter into life and thousands more wait in silence’ -- according to whether or not you succeed in making this conjecture; without this you have no calling for science and you should do something else. For nothing is worthy of man as man unless he can pursue it with passionate devotion.”
Max Weber “Science as a vocation” Wissenschaft als Beruf from Gessamlte Aufsaetze zur Wissenschaftslehre, Tubingen 1922 pp. 524-55 Originally delivered as a speech at Munich University 1918. Published in 1919 by Duncker & Humboldt, Munich


In making this conjecture to undertand social reality, I find it necessary to transcends all disciplinary boundaries merely to grasp what does it mean to understand social reality.



Pp. 192-196
The Republic: Part VII: The Philosopher ruler Penguin Books 1955. Desmond Lee Translation.
Pp. 241-243 (514a to 516e)
The Republic: Part VII: The Philosopher ruler Penguin Books 1955. Desmond Lee Translation.
See CPR pp. 59, 60, 61, 299, 581
From CPR, CPJ etc
explain original apperception I am.
The origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodore W Adorno, Walter Benjamin and the Frankfurt Institute Susan Buckmorss)
which is at that time a very class structured assymetrical Marxian reality dominated by the bourgeoisie pp. 76 of Buckmorss
Bloch introduced this term in Geist der Utopie (1923)
From Foucault Politics, Philosophy, Culture Interviews and other writings 1977-1984 trans. Alan Sheridian and others. pp. 252 The ethics of Sexuality: The Return of Morality
Explain why paradoxes.
Coined by Benjamin walter see pp. 102 of The origin of Negative dialectics: The Method in Action: Constructing Constellations
Coined by Adorno see pp. 102 of The origin of Negative dialectics: The Method in Action: Constructing Constellations
ee pp. 102 of The origin of Negative dialectics: The Method in Action: Constructing Constellations
In the First Introduction of the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant makes the argument that “all judgments about the purposiveness of nature, be they aesthetic or teleological, stand under [a priori principles belonging exclusively to the reflecting power of judgment of the subject] pp 41.” There is a certain purposiveness or understood more simply, purpose in the order of things in nature such as how as Kant writes, “rivers e.g. carry with them all sorts of soil helpful for the growth of plants […] on many coasts, the tide spreads this silt on the land, or deposits it on the bank pp. 239.” This means that there is some sort of empirical order in nature or a sense of an objective purposiveness of nature pp. 37. Yet, the ultimate question of what nature is is grounded solely on the principle of the subject’s reflective power of judgment which uses these perceived empirical natural ends in accordance with principles and concepts of reason pp. 40 to establish the ultimate causal connection. This happens a priori and precedes all empirical laws.

As Kant writes, “The judgment about the purposiveness in things in nature, which is considered as a ground of their possibility (as ends of nature), is called a teleological judgment pp.34” A detailed explication of this whole phenomenon would entail an explication of Kant’s whole transcendental system, how concepts of reasons work, how the faculty of imagination works, how is the reflective power of judgment different from the determining power of judgment and how they all somehow fit with the natural ends and laws of nature yet precede it. The explication of this is still of much philosophical speculation and is heatedly debated in the Kantian scholarship. But for our purposes, I bring this up because it is of much relevance to my thoughts on the primacy of the subject in establishing the ultimate grounds of causal and teleological relations between things. The above exposition thus aims to only give a general feeling of how (1) there is empirical laws but (2) the subject is still primarily the one that gives it its ultimate unity.

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Nietzsche in the Will To Power Book Three: Principles of a New Evaluation: defines a criminal as a man who risks his life, his honor, his freedom – a man of courage. (Spring-Fall 1887 pp. 392). By taking this move, Nietzsche is neutralizing and giving legitimacy to the people who have acted in ways against their social order. He says “There is no such thing as durable ultimate units, no atoms, no monads” here too “beings” are only introduced by us (from grounds of practicality and utility). (Nov 1887 March 1888). The only essentially understandable nature of social reality is in its very contradictory antagonistic chaotic fashion. “… the world is not an organism at all, but chaos.” (Nov 1887-March 1888). No desiderata, ideal values or totality – ossified good and bad should judge our being. Only we should judge and live by the standards created for our own. The basic inner essence of our being is an essential will to power. For Nietzsche to say this is to mean that life is always a process where man uses the desiderata he is taught through socialization as a tool to becoming more than his current state such that the only thing about life is a constant state of becoming and overcoming. To feel the “will’s forward thrust again and again becoming master over that which stands in its way (696 1887-March 1888 pp. 370).” As such, the Nietzschean argument is that anything that is against the subject’s will to power, are obstacles. If we can reduce social nature to anything, the subject is the primary make up of social life.

In Book II of the Critique of Morality, Nietzsche reminds us that all moralities are systems of evaluations (256 1887-1888 pp. 148) and all evaluations are always made from a definite perspective (259 1884 pp, 149) of someone else or someone elses’ will to power which takes on an image of a universal validity or an image of disinterestedness (261 1883-1888 pp. 150). But we need to be cautious because everytime these ideal moral values are ossified and crystallized, they may surrender the well being of every individual. Hence, what we can take from Nietzsche is the need to problematize all systems of moral evaluations and ask, who is it from, what is it made for, does it still commensurate with the needs and people of our current state of society? As Nietzsche himself writes: “whence does it derive the right to this judgment? How does the part come to sit as judge over the whole?” (pp. 180 331 1883-1888). We should not take for granted where moral values come.

In Nietzsche’s arguments, he pushes still further. Nietzsche inverts the status of people abiding by the norms and ideals. He writes: “The ideal […] flatters man to be obedient where he is only an automaton.” Further in the Critique of the Good man, Nietzsche questions all the ossified ‘pre-made’ values of integrity, dignity, sense of duty, justice, humanity, honesty, good conscience. The good man essentially is the best man of integrity, honesty and by conventional wisdom, we would take him as good. But Nietzsche wants to say that these good men have only taken the short cut to a safe and easy life. They “make a means of life into a standard of life (354 March-June 1888) pp. 195; he does not posit any goals for himself (358 1887-1888 pp. 196).” For Nietzsche as we have seen, life is about a constant becoming and overcoming. It is about a thirst to live as one wills, to construct one’s own goals and ideals, and hence it is to re-think what is valuable for oneself; about living dangerously and daringly. It is not about submission to ideals and thereby living like automaton.

“I assess a man by the quantum of power and abundance of will: not by its enfeeblement and extinction; I regard a philosophy which teaches the denial of the will to power as a teaching of defamation and slander… (Spring-Fall 1887; rev. Spring-Fall 1888 pp. 205)”

To those who simply follow, he inverts their prestigious good moral status as “qualities of mediocrity” (389 1883-1888 pp. 209) and in many of his notes, he calls these people, herds or the herd instinct. This is not very much different from how Foucault calls society as a massive “sheperds” or “members of a flock” in a Lecture he delivered at Stanford University on Human Values (Ch 4. Politics and Reason) where Foucault suggests the genesis of rationalization and the excesses of power. But either way, the point is that for Nietzsche, to be good is to be beyond good – taking the ideals of good, for oneself (weaker argument) and totally re-inventing them for one self (stronger argument). Hence, the conventionally understood “good men” who abide to all moral norms are not good, but herd like people who have forgone their will to live as individuals with reflexivity. Their will, is merely a will to nothingness (401 March-June 1888 pp. 216). Those who have instead lived for themselves according to the values they spin for themselves are the true goodness. They have are the ones who have become master to the will to life (401 March-June 1888 pp. 216) which is all life is about – constant becoming and overcoming.

A humble response to Kant's Was ist Aufklarung

Was ist Aufklarung

When Kant was writing this short essay on Aufklarung, he was adamant in the good and proper use of Reason. There are inherent in his paper, several pertinent concerns and perhaps assertions. (1) The “duty” [emphasis added] of all man to use Reason for his own for Kant perspicaciously observes the lack of will and courage of man to emerge from their illusory safe haven i.e. platonic cave with the flux of chimerical shadows. For Kant, “duty” is a moral imperative or issue (in a weaker sense) that he addresses in great depth in his 3rd Critique of Practical Reason and his Metaphysics of Morals. Afterall, such great strides are made because it seems to me important that Reason has to have a “last grounding point ” for Kant. But this will be merely mentioned and I will not go further. (2) The right of man to use Reason to attain human progress for he fights in his 2nd Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment for man’s pivotal role in giving “order and coherence to the world…” Kant puts it very succinctly in “Was ist Aufklarung?” that any age which puts the posterity to a condition that shuts off further enlightenment from the human race is absolutely null and void. One can see from this that Kant takes man’s right to Reason as very cardinal in many aspects of life. (3) The legitimate use of Reason. This, (3) will be the focus of this short review.

For Foucault said this rightly in his intepretation of Kant’s Was ist Aufklarung, that Kant’s critiques or philosophical ethos can be reduced to a “limit attitude” that of a critique (or series of critiques) consisting in analyzing and reflecting upon the limits of our understanding and Reason. This is important for in the age of englightenment where man may “[more] freely deal with things,” man cannot transgress the truth-claims he is permitted to make. As Foucault writes, the Englightenment is the moment when humanity will put reason to use without subjecting it to any authority and it is precisely at this moment that the critique is necessary, since its role is precisely that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to (a) determine what can be known, (b) what must be done and (c) what maybe hoped. For Kant, (a) and (c) takes up a large proportion of his efforts and time and it is to (a) and (c) I will try to discuss more about.

In trying to discuss (a) and (c), I will use a particular example that Kant has only very briefly touched upon. He very vaguely says in Was ist Aufklarung: “…because religious incompetence is not only the most harmful but also the most degrading of all.” Why does he make this claim? From S83-S91 of the Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment, Kant wants to say that in the mere mechanism of nature, the empirical reality that we can find no final end(s) defined as that end which needs no other as the condition of its possibility [CTPJ, pp. 302] or in layman terms and for our purposes, God. Everything in nature (material nature outside us and even inside us i.e. our thinking nature ) that we can see is always in turn conditioned. If so, Kant wants to say 2 things. Firstly that “if [final ends is] in the order of ends dependent on no further condition other than merely the idea of it [CTPJ pp. 302],” then we cannot find anything in nature that gives us any reason to claim that “God exists.” In fact, we cannot have valid objective cognition (i.e. have an empirical intuition of God in or from nature) of “God.” Secondly, Kant would eventually want to say “God” is an ideal of Reason. Whose Reason? Our Reason. Man’s Reason. In the world, there is only a single sort of being whose causality is teleological [and] aimed at ends (humans). But because humans’ causality is so constituted i.e. interpretable as so structured by laws themselves, we humans too have to follow our so deeply embedded constitution to determine ends and create order and connections in the world and [emphasis added] these transcendental a priori laws become [emphasis added] represented by humans to themselves as something out there in-itself, unconditioned and independent of natural conditions and themselves. But in fact, these transcendental a priori laws that we think have such “thereness” [emphasis added] are constituted in humans themselves. Man is the one who sets the highest end, the highest good in the world.

“[Man’s] existence contains the highest end itself, to which, as far as he is capable, he can subject the whole of nature, or against which at least he need not hold himself to be subjected by any influence from nature. – Now if things in the world, as dependent beings as far as their existence is concerned, need a supreme cause acting in accordance with ends, then the human being is the final end of creation; for without him the chain of ends subordinated to one another would not be completely grounded; and only in the human being, although in him only as a subject of morality, is unconditional legislation with regards to ends to be found, which therefore makes him alone capable of being a final end, to which the whole of nature is teleologically subordinated.” [CTPJ pp. 302]

Even happiness Kant puts on the asterisk sidenote is a subjective end of humans. Not the final ends of humans. With this short passage, it is clear that Kant wants to establish (stronger sense: establishes) that the final end of humans is his own existence wherefrom everything sprints forth. Thus in light of the Aufklarung, Kant in his 3rd Critique wants to first establish that 1) Man is the ultimate subject of all teleological causality. He is the final end in himself subjected to no one else and no other authority. Hence, he has freedom and thus, autonomy and power to act in this and that way in the Age of Enlightenment. “Religious incompetence as harmful,” then I inteprete it to be Kant’s way of saying that if we do not understand how our faculties work and more cardinally, how we are only [emphasis added] subject to our own Moral Law and hence Reason to freely act, then we will be prey to dogmatists and to others’ nefarious use of Reason to justify unjustifiable claims. In the Age where man can use his faculties freely but lets his “chance go wasted,” because of “laziness and cowardice,” Kant thinks is degrading. “Religious competence” is then grounded and must be grounded in developing the right attitude to use Reason to firstly, make claims of this and that and secondly, in a non-Kantian way (more layman way of putting it), understand things. But this is only one part of the story for there is the “negative-limits” of what man can say or do with his freedom which is the (a) that I ambition to only briefly cover.

It is common for man to infer from the ends of nature that he cognizes empirically to the supreme cause of nature and its properties. Kant calls this, physicotheology which is I think one of the commonest way of talking [emphasis added] amongst layman of the existence of God i.e. that there is X Y Z things in nature with specific X Y Z properties that are unique to it and if it is not created by man, it must be created by God. But this is what Kant replies us with:

“Now I say physicotheology, no matter how far it might be pushed, can reveal to us nothing about a final end of creation; for it does not even reach the question about such an end [CTPJ pp. 304].” When we empirically intuit something, we only see it as the appearance it manifests to our faculty of sensibility. It makes conceptual sense after it goes through our faculty of understanding. But the very concept of a world cause, i.e. God, cannot be justified by it for nothing in that empirical intuition presents God to us. Thus Kant continues by saying that: “It can thus certainly justify the concept of an intelligent world-cause [emphasis added], as a merely subjectively appropriate concept for the constitution of our cognitive faculty [emphasis added] of the possibility of the things that we make intelligible to ourselves in accordance with ends” Thus, what Kant wants to say here is that the intuition or representation serves only as a justification [emphasis added] of the concept of an intelligent-world cause but this is far from claiming [emphasis added] that there is a “God that exists out there.” Also then, the concept of God at most [emphasis added] can only have an appropriate connexion to our cognitive faculty of the possibility of things (refers most aptly to the faculty of our Reason creating the possible ideas). I think another short abstract deals with this much better:

“But since the data and hence, the principles for determining that concept of an intelligent world cause (as highest artist) are merely empirical, they do not allow us to infer any properties beyond what experience reveals to us in its effects: which since it can never comprehend the whole of nature as a system, must often hit upon grounds of proof that (to all appearance) contradict one another as well as that concept, but it can never, even if we were able of having an empirical overview of the whole system as long as it concerns mere nature, elevate us beyond nature to the end of its existence itself, and thereby to the determinate concept of that higher intelligence.” [CTPJ pp. 305]

What can be drawn from the above is again that empirical data that we intuit from our faculty of sensibility is simply empirical data as what it is. There is such a vast amount of data in the world that we can simply pick on anyone and find that something we picked on contradicts with the one that we apparently used to justify God’s existence. The empirical intuition or “data” is one very tiny fragment of the whole complete system of nature whereas “God” as an ideal of Reason is if we recall, a final end of nature defined also as the totality that encompasses. Thus, Kant is saying here in this quote that as long as we can never have a total empirical overview of the whole system, we have no rights to make that huge inferential leap to say X justifies God exists, hence God exists. Nothing from empirical experience can sufficiently [emphasis added] be “fitted” to the determinate concept of God (ideal idea). Yet I must add also this, that it is not always the scrupulous or iniquitous nature of man who makes such an error but it is inherent in us to make such an error especially if we do not understand how our faculties work. Thus for instance, if one does not understand what is meant by the “faculty of judgment” i.e the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal dem Allgemeinen, then we will not know that once the universal (the rule; law; principle) is gven, then it is in our determining power of judgment [emphasis added] to subsume any particular under it. If we are ignorant to this, then we can easily and fallaciously make that unjustified inferential leap. Hence, the Age of Enlightenment whereby we can speak freely of this and that and use Reason is drastically different and disparate from the Attitude of Enlightenment [emphasis added] which involves knowing the limits of our Reason and on a more positive note, understanding our various faculties.

Hence, I arrive at the last part of what Foucault has re-wrote as (c) what can be hoped for a posteriori the understanding of how our faculties work and the limits of our faculties and hence Reason. Prior to that, I must emphasize that this short essay is not going to give insights to the “how our faculty works” question which is far beyond what I can accomplish at this moment in time. But the problematique is still this: that if we cannot say that God exists, or a highest legislative author exists theoretically [emphasis added], since we cannot have sufficient empirical data or intuitions that adequately support such a total final being, what then can we say? Also, how can or should we act? Here, Kant throws in the Practical Use of Reason. God for Kant is still important for our practical moral needs. If God does not belong to speculative reason and theoretical cognition, for Kant, it belongs to morality alone. God freedom and immortality are thus objects of a moral faith. In a paper by Jane Kellner, she describes this moral faith as a ‘motivation’ or what I think can be called a reason-able motivation [emphasis added]. Kant’s God is thus that of a holy lawgiver, good governor and just judge [RWTLORA pp. lxi]. These cannot be theoretically conceived but can be practically and morally conceived for the purpose of making or more precisely put, motivating man to be a morally rational being. But just on an ending note, what makes man moral is his own looking upon his own [emphasis added] law of reason like duty [emphasis added] as his highest allegiance [emphasis added]. Man is subjected to his own law of reason that acts as his voice of duty i.e. like the categorical imperative calling upon him to do what is right (based on his own law of reason; moral law). As a binding law or duty that man places upon himself via. His self legislative reason (and with faith in postulates of God), man Kant thinks will be obligated [emphasis added] to do the right thing. Most cardinally, to be in such a way morally obligated by one’s own law of reason or moral law, this must be predicated first on the freedom to act in accordance with man’s own laws. Upon this freedom is man’s own moral law or law of reason grounded. Freedom is in this case, man’s ultimate a priori and only by adhering to man’s own self prescribed moral law can man attain Summum Bonum i.e happiness proportioned to moral worth [RWTLORA pp. lvii]. Happiness i.e. Summum Bonum is like God, man’s rational ideals that man must have faith in for something like the Summum Bonum, as an end created by man is (1) not theoretically cognizable and (2) not something that can be guaranteed even for with the most punctilious observance of the moral laws, we may not attain Summum Bonum [RWTLORA pp. lvi]. What we can hope for and have faith in is then different from what we can know and it is crucial [emphasis added] to draw this distinction.

Thus, man’s freedom in the Age of Enlightenment reigns supreme. He has freedom to act but he is not entirely free to act and Reason as he wishes. The discursive limits of our Reason and truth-claims will only be apparent if one understand how one’s faculties work. Aufklarung ist hence, an attitude that one must take upon himself to study and understand our faculties. This was Kant’s critical transcendental project for a major part of his life. What then may we hope for once again? We can still in the crudest sense, ‘talk God,’ ‘immortality,’ ‘freedom,’ and ‘soul’ but one must always be conscious of talking about them as theoretical cognitions that have objective validity or are they ideals of reason as like for Kant, for a greater (greatest) purpose, man?


“Here are the limits of our reason clearly delineated. Whoever presumes to overstep them will be punished for his zeal by reason itself with disgust and error. But if we remain within these limits, we shall be rewarded by becoming both wise and good [RWTLORA pp. lxii].”

Theories of action in the context of food politics: Plausibility of a Rational and Conscious Volition

Intrigued by the prodigious amounts of tendentious and antagonistic nutritional guidelines conferred onto people, I will in this paper attempt to lambast specific premises of the rational choice model. Using an amalgamation of academic and scientific studies focusing on the food and nutritional industry, I aim to illuminate how the complexity of the task environment (Bendor, 2003) can cripple the ability of man to rationally make healthy and optimal choices for themselves and society. The underlying premise of this paper is that actors do not act as rationally as we think they do and there is never perfect information.

The key premise of Rational Choice theorists is that actors have perfect information in decision making (Friedman & Hechter, 1988: pp. 202) and will choose the best choice is simply erroneous. In the food industry, information is never perfect. Information is contradicting, flawed and new findings are constantly being produced confounding everyone. The isodynamic law by Rubner that “a calorie is a calorie” has dominated and been deeply rooted in the minds of the hoi polloi (Taubes, 2007: pp. 276). Hence, it has been taken as axiomatic that excessive caloric intake over expenditure is a major cause of obesity, heart diseases and cancer. Because fat and protein have a higher calorie count than carbohydrates, it is cited in the dietary goals for the United States is to eat a low-fat diet (Taubes, 2007). In the most recent 2005 dietary guidelines, Americans are instructed to consume “less than 10% of their calories from saturated fatty acids,” “keep total fat intake at the level of 20% to 35%” and eat a level of charbohydrates at “45-65%” (“Dietary Guidelines for Americans”, 2005). This diet is claimed to have many health benefits.

Yet, many studies have shown otherwise. Vegetarian Lierre Keith (2009) has written on how 30 years of vegetarianism and low-fat diet has completely ravaged her health. In the 1970s, the National Heart Lung and Blood institute albeit spending hundreds and millions of dollars to prove a linkage between lower cholesterol and reduced chronic heart disease failed abysmally (Taubes, 2007: pp. 55). Epidemoiological studies have also shown that there is not even a correlation between saturated fat consumption and cholesterol levels or heart diseases (Keith, 2009). Masai warriors ingest 300g of animal fat everyday and have the lowest cholestrol levels (Keith, 2009). Similarly, the people of Tokelau and Pukapuka who consumed coconut oil – high in saturated fat as their staple food showed no signs of cardiovascular or degenerative diseases (Keith, 2009). Japanese who increased their consumption of total fat and animal fat saw a decline in the incidence of stroke (Keith, 2009). Many nutritional scientists have shown that what in fact causes fat accumulation and is linked to a series of cardiovascular diseases and even cancer is solely, insulin which singularly encourages lipid trapping (Neel, 1999). This is corroborated by endless studies and experiments. One most striking one is a sand-rat experiment done by a physiologist Knut Schmidt Nielsen in the 1960s who fed two groups of rat, one with carbohydrate laden Purina Chow and another on vegetables alone and the former grew obese and diabetic (Taubes, 2007: pp. 248-249) Similarly, monkeys or primates of the University of Maryland got fat and obese on a low fat, high carbohydrate, low fat chow (Hanssen, 1936: pp. 97-106). In experiments on man by Krauss & Burke (1982: 97-104), they have shown that on a diet of 46% fat, the chances of manifesting an atherogenic profile i.e. of having atheromatous plaques in arteries is lower than of a diet of only 10% fat. The latter is said to have a threefold higher risk of heart disease (Krauss & Burke, 1982: 97-104). Both Pollan and Taubes (2009) have also cited how the Women’s Health Initiative study of dietary fat whilst spending $415 million to measure health outcomes of nearly 49 000 people failed to show that a reduction in fat to 20% lowers health risks.

Thus, just on the basis of the emergence of new studies and experiments debunking conventional nutritional wisdom of a “low fat, higher carbohydrate diet,” it is obvious that information in the food and nutrition industry is never perfect and complete and can be highly confusing. If information is never perfect, contrary to rational choice theory, consumers are never making decisions with perfect knowledge. In fact, decisions – to eat a low fat, increase carbohydrate diet is often just downright wrong. More importantly, often, consumers do not even know what is in their foods and let alone the health implications of these ingredients. “Soy” for instance is the most controversial. It is in almost every food. Cheap soy proteins and soy flour are hidden in patties, spaghetti sauces and ground beef to increase the bulk of foods, extend shelf life, stop lumping of foods, and to guarantee firmness and cohesion of foods (Daniel, 2005). Soy protein isolates (SPI) and refined soy protein concentrates (SPC) are found in products ranging from nonfat dry milk replacers, whipped toppings, coffee whiteners, non dairy ice cream and even infant formulas (Daniel, 2005). But soy protein isolates (SPI) have many precarious health implications. The first and most noteworthy is that in the 1970s, the Federation of American Society for Experimental Biology (FASEB) concluded that the only safe use for SPI is as a sealer for cardboard boxes and not for consumption because of the carcinogen nitrosamine and toxin lysinoalanine from SPI (Daniel, 2005). Soy is associated with growth problems, amino acid deficiencies, minerals malasorption, endocrine distruption and carcinogenesis. Infants weened onto soy developed vitamin A deficiency, get diagnosed with keratomalacia - an eye disease, diarrhea (Daniel, 2005) and the list goes on. But the point is clear. Soy is a stealth agent in our foods and most often, as consumers, we have absolutely no knowledge of its presence. There is a dearth of knowledge and information contrary to sweeping claims of perfect information made by rational choice theorists.

In addition to the above, as Stiglitz (2002) have asserted, there is always asymmetries of information. There will always be some people who know more than others – like the nutritionists who know far more than politicians and consumers. This predicament, I attribute to a very fundamental structural change in our society whereby the individual is emancipated from his organic environment into a mechanical one characterized by a typic specialization and division of labour (Durkheim, 1947). The natural consequence of this is not only that people in different specializations know more than others in other specializations but that we as humans have to deal with a more complex environment which far exceeds the computational and cognitive abilities of man (Bendor, 2003: pp. 435). As a corollary of the vast amounts of information, the common person would then most probabilistically (A) satisfice. He would not churn out a complete ordering and knowledge of all good nutritional and food options prior to making his decision as the rational theory dictates. Instead, the actor would satisfice as soon as he finds a food or guideline that he thinks, commensurates with his internal standards. He is likely to form judgments based on his own presumed standards that a ‘low fat’ diet is good and ‘therefore I should eat more carbohydrates and apples laden with sugar’ simply because of the great uncertainty and paucity of information.

In fact, satisficing is what the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs – a bipartisan non-legislative committee that churned out the most fallacious Dietary Goals in America’s history (Taubes, 2009: 45-46) did. According to Brody (1981), the Dietary Goals just “grabbed a bag of ambiguous studies and speculation” and made it an established fact. A key person in this is Nick Mottern who avoided vast amounts of problematic evidence in the nutritionism literature and exclusively relied on just a single study by Harvard nutritionist, Mark Hegsted – who self-declared that he was an extremist in dietary-fat issues and who unconditionally believed that eating less fat would prevent heart diseases (Taubes, 2009: 46). This is despite Mark Hegsted himself knowing that many scientific nutritionists in his field did not share his believes (Taubes 2009: pp. 46). This very cardinal exemplification not only shows Nick Mottern satisficing and not accessing the entirety of knowledge in the field prior to making a decision. But it raises serious epistemological issues in the creation of knowledge that is dispensed to the rest of society and whose flawed dietary model maybe adopted by other regions in the world. This is of great importance because in the field of obesity research in the 1970s for instance, consensus and judgments were only dominated by fewer than a dozen man such as Theodore Van Itallie, Albert Stunkard, Jean Mayer, Jules Hirsch etc and so, if one were not in their group, one will have barely any influence (Taubes, 2009: pp 415-416).

Following from the above, actors can even act downrightly irrationally making decisions and claims based purely on personal enmity. This is the case when Van Itallie declared a personal hatred towards Atkins claiming that he had an appalling personality and was an idiot (Taubes: 2009, pp. 417). Thereafter, Van Itallie wrote an American Medical Association AMA-sponsored denunciation of Atkins in 1973 and claimed that the diet is “grossly imbalanced”. As a result, Atkins was considered a faddish diet and was thoroughly sidelined as “dangerous” in spite of and in face of all the paradoxes of the American Diet. This phenomena of irrationality in fact buttresses studies contrary to rational choice theory, done by Ralph (2009) and Izard (2009) claiming that how emotions play a central role in our neural and cognitive processes and that emotions are key mediators in our thought and action.

Moreover, (B) individuals are not machines able to perfectly quantify their choices then purposively choose the best one. Their judgments are always subjected to framing effects. Framing as Kahneman (2003) rightly claims, is a ubiquitous reality (Kahneman, 2003: pp. 1459). The way something is framed can have a stupendous effect on the decision choice of a person. This is precisely why in 1998 alone, The Center for Commercial Free Public Education, an advocacy organization in Oakland California reported that Pepsi or Coke have signed “pouring rights” contracts with schools at a cost of $100 million to them (Nestle, 2000: pp. 309). “Pouring rights” give these companies rights to install and maintain something like 135 vending machines in the district (Nestle: 2000: pp. 310) as a means to advertise their “brand”. These companies simply know that the more they advertise, the more salient their brands will be and the more sales they will get. But nothing is more striking then Kraft who spends $80-$90 annually just advertising to children (Lewin, Lindstrom, Nestle: 2006: pp. 338). Kraft knows that packaging makes a drastic difference. They package dangerous sugar laden foods as “Back to School Snacks” containing Double Stuf oreos, Ritz Bitz Sandwiches and Cheese Nips (Lewin, Lindstrom, Nestle: 2006: pp. 338). Kraft also offer children contests, games promotion and free gifts and their websites often contain games that prompts colour advertisments on Kraft products (Lewin, Lindstrom, Nestle: 2006: pp. 338). But most ingeniously, Kraft frame themselves as “healthy” by driving the conscious attention away from their high sugar and empty caloric products to their conspicuous encouragements to kids to exercise (Lewin, Lindstrom, Nestle: 2006: pp. 339). For instance, on their website postopia.com, in between games, Kraft prompts kids to grab their bikes and go for a spin. This frames Kraft as a “healthier choice” for kids although no matter how reformulated and “enhanced” their products are, kids will never be “healthier” eating these quintessential junk food. Thus, retrospectively, all these advertising targeting at kids of young age also highlights the importance of creating high accessibility (Kahneman, 2003) of the brand names in the intuitive thoughts of people. The more easily brand names come to the minds of people amidst the multiplicity of brands out in the market, the more sales will be made. Information is thus never complete and always subjected to manipulation by food producers who have more information than consumers.

According to the classical rational model of economics, government intervention is viewed as an ignoble act that runs contrary to the consecrated “free market logic” (Stiglitz, 2002: pp. 460). Many belief that free markets will lead to efficient outcomes led by the “invisible hand” (Stiglitz, 2002: 460). In other words, the best outcomes are attainable only if the market is free and unregulated. But this is just plainly wrong. As Stiglitz (2002) have argued, markets are imperfect and regulation is needed. This point manifests itself in the American food industry whereby there is no federal health agency to lead the nation on dietary issues leaving it all in the hands of the USDA – department of agriculture whose mandate is to promote US’s agriculture products or in other words, to promote people to purchase and eat more. The result is, even more ambiguous dietary guidelines such as “aim for a healthy weight” and “moderate your intake of sugars” (Nestle, 2003: pp. 781). In 2003, the sugar association lobbied vociferously against the World Health Organization’s recommendation for sugar intake to be limited to 10% of all daily diets. The sugar association has coalesced with 300 other big food industry groups such as Coca-cola, Pepsico to pressure the US health secretary Tommy Thompson to have the recommendation withdrawn (Boseley, 2003). They claimed that scientific information on sugar intake is flawed and can be increased to at least 25% or one-quarter of the diets of people (Boseley, 2003). Thus, I am indeed arguing alongside experts like Michael Pollan and Marion Nestle and amongst many others that there has to be strong central authority and regulation against private interests. In no way can the food industry be led to run freely as classical economists would have argued based on their model and still produce the best and most efficient outcomes for the health of society. The spirit of capitalism and its unceasing pursuit for profit will know no bounds. But what dismays one most is that even where there is authority, the mettle of money can assert such an overwhelming influence on laws to render bad science right. This is seen Proctor & Gamble’s attempts to make legal its non-digestible fat substitute olestra in the market. Olestra has raised several health concerns (Nestle, 1998: pp508-511.). It is touted to have laxative effects, interference with absorption of fat soluble nutrients etc posing serious questions to long term gastronomical safety (Nestle, 1998: pp. 508-511.). Thus, to get olestra marketable, P&G spent some $500 million in research development and activities targeted to the FDA, professional societies, health scientists etc and launched persistent campaigns to extend patent rights as a food addictive (Nestle, 1998: pp 508-511.). All FDA approvals were expedited by P&G’s petitions and did not commensurate with required or sufficient scientific testing (Nestle, 1998: pp 508-511.). This hence shows the prowess of any large firm to assert epistemological rights by virtue of “brute force” and who knows what will happen were there liberalism and deregulation in the food industry? Consumers might be insinuated with endless dubious “healthy” products in their diets and the above demonstration simply proves the falsehood of the classical economic model. We must thus be extremely insouciant and doltish to be able to think man can make rational choices for the ultimate goodness of man.

A lot of rational choice theory have been about the ability of the social agent to rationally and consciously make conscious decisions. Yet, this is claim is highly debatable. Adolphs (2009: pp. 702-703) has illuminated in his paper how damage to the amygdala results in an impaired ability to recognize facial expressions especially at the eye regions. Similarly, I will argue along the same lines here that much of social behaviour is not always a rationally determined and conscious outcome. Much of social actions and behavior is highly affected by what we put into our bodies. For the longest time, obesity and compulsive eating has been attributed to the individual’s state of character. Since the times of ancient Greece, philosophers such as Aristotle (2009: pp. 23-40) have attributed misdeeds and all other defective and iniquitous acts to the individual who is denounced for his dearth of ethike or moral virtue. Such debased individuals are always unable to act for the best end of life and are always lured by sinful and reprehensible pleasures to act in excessive or deficient ways (Aristotle, 2009). The locus of blame always falls upon the individual based upon the underlying premise of the individual as rational actors responsible for all his acts. Based on Aristotle and the classical rational theory model, the obese is obese because of his paltry of self-control and voracious appetite. Hence, this implies also that if one assiduously and ascetically maintain a good diet or eat a calorie-deprived diet, one would lose weight and would reflect a virtuous character. But studies have shown that fatness or thinness is not a consequence of one’s resolution and steadfastness. A condition known as progressive lipodystrophy characterized by lower-body obesity in the thighs and bottoms with an emaciated top-body (Taubes, 2009: pp. 361) shows that it is predominantly biological factors that determine fatness and thinness and not the quantity of calories consumed by individuals. Somehow, masses of fat simply accumulate in these localized spots. Other studies have shown that lesions in a region called the ventromedial hypothalamus (VHM) induces corpulence in rats that had their pitulary glands removed (Taubes, 2009: pp. 367). It simply shows that no matter how rational individuals are, not all actions are within their conscious control as presumed by the rational model.

Most fundamentally, a biologist, George Wade from the University of Massachusetts have declared that obesity can be brought on without overeating (Taubes, 2009: pp. 361). Simply by manipulating sex hormones of rats, one can significantly increase or decrease their weight. The key singular culprit of overeating and obesity is biological. It is the result of insulin as a hormonal mechanism that singularly causes fatness and obesity (Taubes, 2009: pp. 378). Diabetics who were injected with insulin quickly put on weight (Taubes, 2009: pp. 361) and insulin is used to fatten emaciated anorexics. Insulin secreted by our pancreas promotes fat deposition because it singularly stimulates the transport of glucose into the fat cells thereby causing the accumulation of fat (Taubes, 2009: pp. 390). Contrariwise, when insulin levels are low, fat flows out of our adipose tissue and fat deposit shrinks – a process called lipolysis (Taubes, 2009: pp. 361). Taubes (2009) utilizes a rich source of scientific studies to illuminate this point which buttresses the emerging pool of corrective dietary guidelines in the literature. Most famous of which is the Atkins (2002) Diet which promotes lipolysis by encouraging a diet high in good natural fats and protein with good portions of fibre from berries and vegetables. The rational for this is straightforward. Carbohydrates and sugars especially refined ones singularly produce a blood-sugar response i.e. stimulate our pancreas to secrete insulin – the hormone which stores fat and thus, the natural solution to obesity and fatness is biological. It is to correct switch the body from a carbohydrate burning (glucosis) machine to a fat-burning (lipolysis) machine that taps into its own fat stores for fuel (Atkins, 2002: 53-54). When the body is in lipolysis, hunger is reduced when the body consumes its own fat for energy (Atkins, 2002: pp. 55). Thus, again, to reiterate, there are many processes, biological, which determines a lot of our behaviour such as hunger or the obscene gluttony of the fat who is portrayed as one who “crazily consumes excessively and uncontrollably”. Biologists now argue that if they do and when they do, it is because of a defect in the fat metabolism as the carbohydrate-rich foods people consume gets stored in our adipose tissue as fat and are not utilize properly for energy hence causing the constant need to eat and feel hungry (Taubes, 2009). This issue I belief, is cardinal because the obese and fat have a tendency to be socially stigmatized as defective in character lacking steadfastness, resolve, and judgment. In the extreme cases, especially when individuals internalize such social labeling, this will result and can translate to low-self esteem and self-worth in a society that privileges ‘thinness.’ By repudiating and invalidating outmoded and fallacious scientific findings, this may possibly relieve victims of obesity and fatness from self-reproach that may translate to serious ramifications in their lives. Also, this dismisses the notion of individuals as atomistic rational agents who have complete control over their choice-sets and actions.

Conclusion

In retrospect, I hope that this paper has sufficiently debunked key rational choice assumptions of perfect information, thoroughly and absolutely quantifiable choices, the constant rational decision making by decision makers. Also, I hope that it has sufficiently highlighted key epistemological issues in knowledge creation in the food science industry and thereby also reinforcing how knowledge is never complete and perfect and is always dialectical and in a state of procession. If so, then very cardinally, the food industry I argue, cannot be left alone to self-regulate. Left alone, it can never achieve efficacy in providing congruous health guidelines contrary to any classical rational-economics model. Lastly, it is also the objective of this paper to show that individuals do not always act consciously. Hunger and eating for instance, is very much biologically driven and has this paper has shown, actions can even be emotionally driven or simply irrationally executed and downright biased.

Also, as an ending remark, if the state of affairs is so confounding, as individual consumers, I advocate that one follows basic guidelines that Pollan (2009) offers such as: “Eat food,” “avoid food products containing high fructose and corn syrup or sugar,” “avoid food products containing more than five ingredients,” and “eat like an omnivore”. What one should not do however is to give up and sink back to relativism repudiating the entirety of the food complex quandary and arbitrarily form judgments independent of scientific backings. One should still constantly aim to make well-informed rational decisions. Although we are not totally rational beings, rationality is what makes us uniquely humans. As Aristotle (2009: pp. 11-12) rightly puts it, the function or activity of a human soul is implies a rational principle and to use rationality to attain excellence in activities that will eventually contribute to being able to lead a good life. Hence, every individual should utilize rationality to choose the best life constituted by a good and healthy diet.















References

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Aristotle 2009. “The Nicomachean Ethics” Oxford University Press: USA New York

Atkins, C. Robert 2002. “Dr Atkins New Diet Revolution” M Evans and Company Inc.: New York.

Boseley, Sarah 2003. “Sugar industry threatens to scupper WHO” http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2003/apr/21/usnews.food Retrieved March 1st 2010

Brody, Jane 1981b. “Nutritional Factors: What a Diet Actually Do?” New York Times

Daniel, T. Kaayla 2005 “The Whole Soy Story: the dark side of America’s favourite health food” New Trends Publishing Inc: USA

Durkheim, Emile 1947. “The Division of Labour in Society” Free Press: Glencoe IL

Friedman, Debra & Michael Hechter 1988. “The Contributions of Rational Choice Theory to Macrosociological Research” Sociological Theory 6 pp. 201-18

Hanssen, Per 1936. “Treatment of Obesity by a Diet Relatively Poor in Carbohydrates.” Acta Medica Scandinavica Vol 88 Issue 1 pp. 97-106

Izard, Carroll E. 2009. “Emotion Theory and Research: Highlights, Unanswered Questions and Emerging Issues” Annual Review of Psychology 60 pp. 1-25

Kahneman, Daniel 2003. “Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for behavioural Economics” American Economic Review 1449-75

Keith, Lierre 2009. “The Vegetarian Myth: food justice and sustainability” First Edition Flash point press: USA

Krauss, R. M. and D. J. Burke 1982. “Identification of Multiple Subclasses of Plasma Low Density Lipoproteins in Normal Humans” Journal of Lipid Research pp. 97-104

Lewin, Alexandra, Lauren, Lindstrom & Nestle, Marion 2006. “Commentary: Food Industry Promises to Address Childhood Obesity: Preliminary Evaluation” Journal of Public Health Policy Vol. 27, No. 4 pp. 327-348

Nestle, Marion 1998. “The Selling of Olestra” Association of Schools of Public Health Vol 113. No. 6. pp. 508-520

Nestle, Marion 2000. “Soft Drink “Pouring Rights”: marketing empty calories to young children” Association of Schools of Public health Vol 115, No 4. pp. 308-319

Nestle, Marion 2003. “Editorial: The Ironic Politics of Obesity” American Association for Advancement of Science Vol. 299, No. 5608 pp. 781

Neel, J V 1999. “The Thrifty Genotype’ 1998 Nutrition Reviews

Pollan, Michael 2008. “In the defense of food: An eater’s manifesto” Penguin Press: USA, NY 2008

Pollan, Michael 2009. “Food rules” Penguin group: USA

Stiglitz, George 2002. “Information and the change in paradigm in Economics” American Economic Review 92(3) pp. 460-501

Taubes, Gary 2007. “Good Calories, BAD CALORIES: Fats, Carbs and the Controversial Science of Diet and Health” Anchor Books: USA

________ 2005 “Dietary Guidelines for Americans” US Department of Health & Human Services: Retrieved March 1st 2010 http://www.health.gov/dietaryguidelines/dga2005/document/pdf/Chapter6.pdf

Analysis of Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology in the Foucauldian context of ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’

Analysis of Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology in the Foucauldian context of ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’

Kant’s Anthropology is like a ‘body’ molded by a great many distinct regimes [pp. 87] and like the body, Kant’s Anthropology alike cannot understand itself. “Nothing in man – not even his body is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men.” Something else must ground the ‘universal nature of man’ that Kant seems to assert in his flowerily written Anthropology. It is this I construe as the ‘dynamic circularity.’
Genealogy unveils the hazardous play of dominations [pp. 83]. The question of ‘how’ is what concerns me here. Enstehung is ‘emergence [pp. 83].’ It is the moment of arising. It can appear as ‘culmination point(s)’ or decisive conclusion(s) as seen in the universal nature of man in Kant’s Anthropology. But in fact, they merely [hide] the current episodes in a series of subjugations [pp. 83]. The Critique as a transcendental a priority is always battling against its unfavourable conditions [pp 84]. To ‘emerge as’ transcendental and a priori, as a species in-itself in an isolated and superior position, it has to first realize itself as a species [pp. 84]. This immediately entails a process [emphasis added] of emergence prior to it appearing as what it is: transcendental, pure, a priori, durable, uniform and simple. The Critique needs to ‘distance itself’ from the Anthropology for it claims the possibility of a priority whereas the Anthropology is a wholesale evidence of its empiricity, its site or its source of originary. It thus has to establish this ‘void’ or ‘nonplace’ between its roots, the Anthropology and itself. Yet this place for the genealogist is spectacular for it is the point or ‘place’ where one can locate this confrontational relationship and hence, discern a relationship that was made ‘invisible.’ In this pure distance, this interstice [pp. 85], we can see the Critique endlessly trying to dominate the Anthropology by subjecting or subjugating it. The Entstehung or moment of emergence thus at once signifies two things: 1) a moment or arising of the “willer” (the Critique’s will to power - the moment it utilizes and exhaust as much as it can, the possibilities given by the Welt-of-knowledge itself and step foot out of it to establish its ‘sovereignty’ and ‘uniqueness’) and 2) the subjection of the to-be dominated. For Kant’s Critique to emerge as transcendental philosophy, it has to “impose limits, inflict torments and mortifications [pp. 84]” on Anthropology. It torments and mortify Anthropology by firstly using what it gives it, by “forcefully appropriating things necessary to [its] survival [pp. 85]” the Anthropology to me in this reading, is a signification of Kant’s empirical roots (his experiences, exposure to classics, various thinkers etc from which he derives his idea of the transcendent subject). Thus, the Critique a) stems from [emphasis added] Anthropology and b) rips it of all its empiricity in it and from it to derive at a ‘pure conclusion.’ Next, 2) the Critique dominates Anthropology by inflicting torment, battle against Anthropology. It arises (transcendent; universal) above Anthropology by making Anthropology look as though [emphasis added] it is a corollary of [emphasis added] the subject’s transcendental act. This is done quite ingeniously by“imposing” the tripartite structural- division upon the Anthropology. Hence, Anthropology appears to have [emphasis added] the mimicry categories and divisions that is quite synonymous to the Critique. But this appearance is the very result of the Critique’s act of domination its Entstehung (emergence). In other words, 1) there exists a relationship between the Critique and Anthropology 2) the Critique needs Anthropology (Critique’s empiricity) to arise to its grand position. The relationship of domination is not found in a historical time or place [pp. 85] but in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations [pp. 85] on Anthropology. Once the tripartite divisions or rules or transcendental laws are laid, it becomes an automated-engine itself. It stages the stage for its own “meticulously repeated scenes of violence [pp. 85].” Recall, the Critique itself emerges from the real Welt-of-knowledge as Kant wills himself to power. It is his interpretation of the Welt. But once Kant lays down these laws or rules, it is for Foucault as for Nietzsche, “an appearance” that has taken the identity of the truth-itself. This is why Foucault writes:

“Humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.” [pp. 85]

“The nature of these rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in power.” [pp. 85]

The transcendental law that Kant sets down becomes the stage of repeated meticulously repeated scenes of violence [pp. 85]. ‘Violence’ as a term used to signify domination against others or other things which cloaks them in Kant’s own veil (veil of his own will to power) and deprives others of willing themselves into their real existence i.e. understanding and deriving their own interpretations of the Welt. Thus, this is for Nietzsche as for Foucault, not a good thing. Moreover, Foucault goes on to say that “rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose [pp. 85-86].” Thus, once Kant sets down the transcendental law, we, as a conglomeration of ‘others’ or ‘other people’ can use it and think it to be [emphasis added] the real truth although this is merely, Kant’s truth and Kant’s own will. His act of violence, upon us. Thus, for Foucault, to see truth, one must first be able to seize these rules, pervert them, invert their meaning and redirect them against those who initially imposed them (this is the role of the Genealogist). One must be able to “control this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules [emphasis added][pp. 86].” Only through one’s very own interpretation of the Welt, is one able to make one’s own rules (not relying on others) and hence subvert Kant’s rule.

What Kant has done is thus, that he has interpreted “a system of rules [of the welt] which in itself has no meaning and impose a direction, to bend it to his [own] will, to force its participation (or point of view) in a different game (the Kantian game) [pp. 86].” Progress or the development of history is thus interpreted by Foucault as a “series of interpretations” that perhaps overcome and undermine one another. Hence, to dispel this false truism of the Kantian transcendence, we cannot ‘retrace history’ through time but must look at and for and analyze this “non-place” this “pure distance” where this violence is perpetrated.

The role of the genealogist is thus to dispel the Kunst the illusion of a Kantian plenitude and meaningful phenomenon. There thus exists a radical discontinuity, pure space between Anthropology and the Critique through which true relations of tensions are played out. 1) Through perpetual and continual repetitions or the repeat of violence upon Anthropology, the Critique gains its transcendence. Its transcendence is rooted and dependent upon Anthropology by always overcoming it and distancing itself from it. This is also important because the Anthropology is a site that displays all of Kant’s empirical links and affiliations to the Welt or context he lives in and is influenced by. To establish the subject as a priori and sovereign, what has just been said must be effaced completely. The pure distance must be maintained. But also, 2) that Anthropology has its the universal and objectively-knowing voice proclaiming this and that to be truth and can make such “universal claims” of what really is good or human is because it depends on the Critique. It depends on this continual violence and dominance inflicted upon it (tripartite divisions established and ‘given’ by the transcendental subject) so as to appear as a sovereign epistemological structure of its own apart from the Welt-of-knowledge. Yet, it has to distance itself from “its own truth,” its source, the Critique, which is Kant’s will to power that its truth, is itself, Kant’s subjective truth for any recognition of this will subvert Anthropology’s “universality.” There thus exist this very dynamic circularity which is extremely hard to point out in isolation between the Critique and Anthropology. Each inflicts violence upon each other and seeks to triumph each other. The Critique of Anthropology to attain transcendence and the Anthropology of the Critique to sustain its status of its scientific universality.

Anthropology is always the site of perversion and inversion of the power of the Critique for it is evidence of a panoply of empirical influences the Critique is dependent on but denies. Thus, the Critique continually impose its divisions upon the Anthropology to sustain its transcendence and (or but) also, continually distance itself from it for it is the Critique’s source of peril.

Important takeaways:
Although this seems contrary to what Foucault wants to say, for me, most importantly, this whole circular display wants to tell us that 1) every mensch’s own interpretations of the Welt is his own. He takes from the Welt that contains infinite possibilities and interprets it for his own. The subject still reigns supreme in the end or does it? 2) We must thus beware of anyone’s claim of “objectivity” and “universality” for its truism is always someone’s will to power and its “naturalness” and “continuity” always entails one’s interpretations. Also, 3) there will always exist something like Anthropology ‘the body’ or site where there can be an unravelling and or dismantling of the truth of, in this case, the “Critique” 4) Any interpretation of the social world must entail a person’s will to truth and power.

Private?

Wittgenstein

Impossibility of Private Language – showing (1) the futility of self reflection as a solution (2) the greater importance of the role of public communicative rationality (3) Contextualism

(a) According to Meredith Williams: Unlike Schutz, Wittgenstein argues that (1) nothing in a private act of reflection establishes a standard or criterion. (2) So no change is made or “nothing is altered” by the act of reflection. (3) So, to think that by privately reflecting and thinking, we can alter the “meaning of things” in a language is only “an illusion of significance.” [pp. 40]

For Schutz, there exists in the mind a transcendental Kantian notion of “frame of interpretation.” This frame is imposed upon the “non” or meaningless thereby conferring meaning upon it in a spontaneous reflective act [pp. 41]. There exist a relationship between the (a) the object (b) the sign that signifies the object and (c) the interpretive scheme imposed upon by the subject. According to Meredith Williams, a stronger Schutz argument seems to be like a stronger Kantian argument that (c)-to-(b) meaning relationship or that as mentioned, the frame of interpretation is imposed by the subject’s transcendental act of reflection. So, through the subject’s individual private stream of consciousness, there can be a meaning for the object [pp. 44].

Wittgenstein is thus against the whole empiricist tradition thinking that it is possible for the subject to (through some intentional action) individuate a particular mental entity, a sensation or impression, concentrate his attention on it and label it. Thus what the object is to-be is wholly a matter of applying the same expression whenever a qualitatively similar entity is present to the subject’s consciousness. This act of “private ostensive definition” will thereby fix meaning and set a standard for correct use in the future. Whatever the subject senses or whatever intuition is impressed upon the subject, this is conferred upon the sign which has a relation to the object it is referring to [pp. 19].

For Schutz, the intention of a subject is characterized by the active positing of some future state of affairs pictured mentally [pp. 52]. It thus has a sort of consultative and guiding role. But this to Wittgenstein is vague. What guiding role? This question is met by a silence and or ambiguity. The idea of a mental picture cannot serve as a normative standard itself [pp. 44]. Where does it direct to? In what ways? The mental picture of an intentional object does not have a necessarily pre-determined “fit” with the state of affairs and things. There has to be something else. Something that exists as a blueprint to show or point our projection of intentionality in one way rather then the other [pp. 45].

For Wittgenstein, this whole transcendental spontaneous act is not spontaneous. In other words, meaning is not a private affair which is up to the transcendental subject to interpret and impose meaning upon. One argument is this: that anything can be made according to a rule. If so then no course of action can be made determined solely by a rule. There is no support for any interpretation – “Any interpretation still hangs in the air along with what it inteprets and cannot give it any support. Intepretations themselves do not determine meaning [Wittgenstein S198; MW pp. 42].”

Hence it is not about the subject ‘somehow and vaguely’ projecting his interpretation through his attention or reflective act.

For Wittgenstein, there is a specific way of going [pp. 50]. This way of going is obeying the rule blindly [pp. 50]. This blind obedience is taken as a matter of course dependent upon how the individual is trained [pp. 50]. There exists social practices in the subject’s real social world he exists in and how the subject is trained is determined by what is embodied in these social practices [pp. 50] in a community of practitioners [pp. 51]. These social practices determined in a community are the rules that determine how the subject projects his intentional object or state of affairs outward.

In this community of people where interaction takes place, “normative regularity” of what is right and wrong is formed and conventionally sustained [pp. 51]. The intentionality and expectations we have and our projection of them outward is thus always against a background of “what the community does and how it judges” [pp. 51]. The source is not the transcendental solo mental intending or expecting. The meaning and intentionality subjects have is thus based on these blind-rule obedience following social practices formed in a community of people. As opposed to Kant and Schutz, the highest original apperception or the most fundamental and basic source of all things is the social and not the subject.

For Wittgenstein then, all expectations are embedded in a situation (PI S581). The Surroundings or context give what is happening now significance and importance (PI S583). There is nothing significant in itself [pp. 56]. What is significant has to be against a backdrop of something. It is only under certain backdrop or circumstance that certain things count as certain things. Thus, the individual does feel or expect or intend something but they are all part of or set against a backdrop of something. This “backdrop of something” or the context is thus the source of all our sorts of feelings with regards to this and that and expectations with regards to this and that.

The later works of Wittgenstein’s inversion of the Kant-Schutz transcendental subject a priori is thus like Foucault’s inversion of Kant’s a priori placing the origins in discourses.

For Wittgenstein, something has meaning only in acting itself in certain context where it is acted out and used [pp. 56 – 57]. This has the necessary consequence that conversely, if one does not act it out in the context, mere reflective action (merely thinking one can change something) cannot alter the significance of meaning. “Meaning does not lie wholly within the individual’s power to determine but lies outside the individual’s power. What we do in a circumstance carries a significance that cannot reflectively be altered [pp. 57].”

“By nature and by a particular training, a particular education, we are disposed to give spontaneous expression to wishes in a certain circumstances… Suppose it were asked “Do I know what I long for before I get it?” If I have learned to talk, then I do know [PI S441].”

Meaning if we take the Kantian-Schutz transcendentalism point of departure would be conferred by the sui generis by the subject’s spontaneous activity of reflection and projection [pp. 58]. Anyone well versed in Kant’s thoughts would understand this vague act of spontaneity. But for Wittgenstein, the spontaneity is not anything transcendental but this spontaneity occurs when the individual has learnt to talk. When the individual subject has learnt to talk, he has mastered certain skills and certain ways of saying and doing in certain circumstances.

For instance, Christians who are gay often wish they were not because in the context of their religion, they are taught certain normative ways. Thus, what the act of loving a person of the same sex is “simply not up to the individual to determine although whether he so acts is [pp. 59].” The meaning of an act is determined already socially. Members of the community being initiated into this sociality have to learn these meanings. Their in-acting immediately and spontaneously embodies this meanings. Thus, if a girl holds a girl’s hands, this is not just a “holding of acts” but an act of homosexuality. But if a guy holds a girls hands, this is heterosexuality and invokes a sense of “normativity.”

Thus, what an action is or the meaning of an action is, is not conferred upon by the subject but is shown through the contextualized acting itself [pp. 58-59] that exactly embodies senses of normativity and deviancy.

(b) Wittgenstein is against the idea that sensation can be dissociated from behaviour and the reactive context in which the very sensation is embedded [pp. 28]. All sensations cannot be disembedded from its context.

“A wheel that can be turned though nothing else moves with it, is not part of the mechanism (PI S271)”

All sensations and meanings only have significance in a concrete context in which it occurs [pp. 28].

(c) We think we can imagine how others feel in their position. Descartes: “I shall consider myself as having no hands, no eyes, no flesh, no blood nor any senses yet falsely believing myself to posess all these things.” (Descartes 1972: p. 148) Descartes: “I consider that I posess no sense; I imagine that body, figure, extension, movement and place are but the fictions of my mind.” (Descartes 1972: p. 149) MW: Imagine that the stone feels the same pain as I do when I miss a nail and smash my thumb with a hammer [pp. 30].

But the thing is that we simply cannot know what the “word” or “concept” refers to in many other individuals. We cannot imagine we know how exactly from the first person point of view someone is feeling or what meanings he has exactly attached to the word.
Beetle in the box example (S293; MW pp 31)

Everyone can have a beetle in their mind-box. But because no one can look into anyone else’s box i.e. we only have access to our own minds-box so we do not know further. We do not know if someone has something different in his box (mind) or have nothing or something ever changing. Yet how exactly each of us think is irrelevant (“if we construe the grammar of expression of sensation on the model of “object and designation” the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant). Whatever object we have in our mind or whatever beetle it is in our mind, whatever it refers to what can be known only to the speaker; to his immediate, private, sensations. There is thus a private first hand person experience of things.

But it does not matter what is privately thought by each individual for the meaning of the word beetle does not change. It does not change the fact that there is a public usage and that is why we can talk about it. Whatever private meaning it has, it is irrelevant to the public usage meaning of the word “beetle” (PI 293: Wittgenstein asks us to consider a language game in which the word beetle refers to something known and knowable to the subject alone while nonetheless having a public usage MW pp. 32). Beetle has a public and social use but what it feels like, what it is to the individual, is known only to the individual subject alone.

Passages

Searlean postscripts

1) “How is it possible that an agent can be rationally motivated by a desire independent reason?” “What we need to show is how the mere fact that an agent recognizes something as a statement, a promise, or another form of obligation is already grounds for a motivation. How is that possible? The Short answer is that all of these have the upward direction of fit, and to recognize certain sorts of factitive entities as having an upward direction of fit [world to mind] and as having the agent as the subject of the propositional content is already to recognize a reason for acting on that propositional content.” (Logical Structure of Reasons pp. 125)

2) “Here is the first serious puzzle: How can facts in the world, such as the fact that I have a certain vitamin level or that I uttered certain words constitute a rationally compelling motivator?” […] “The trivial truth that I can engage in reasoning only with what is internal to my mind is not inconsistent with the claim that the

3) recognition of objective facts in the world can both be rationally required and can provide external rational grounds for internal motivators.” (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 128)

4) “…What is a reason for an action? […] A reason for an action is any factitive entity that is an element of a set constituting a total reason.” (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 131)

Factitive Entities

Reasons are Factitive entities. Factitive entities i.e. duties, obligations and commitment, all of which have an upward direction of fit (pp. 114). Some factitive entities are a) reasons others are b) things that need explaining (i.e. everything under the sun) (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 105).

Factitive entity is any entity that has a propositional structure, a structure specified by a “that clause.” All Reasons are factitive entities or factivities. What does “that clause” mean? It means that the specification of a reason is essentially propositional. Reason itself, the very entity itself has a factitive or propositional structure. (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 104)

Reasons have a factitive structure because you have to be able to reason with reasons and you can only reason with something that has a propositional structure.

Some factitive entity can represent other factitive entities. They can be a reason for something else. (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 105).



For something to motivate an actor to act in a certain way, there must be an ideal match between the external and internal reasons. “Every element of an external total reason must be matched by an internal element.” (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 116) Something can be an external fact i.e. “A total reason might be entirely external” (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 115) but the most importantly thing is that “In order for such an external reason to function in actual deliberation, it must be represented by some internal intentional state of the agent. The agent [recognizes or believes that it is X].” (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 114-115) Insofar as there are external reasons that play a role in deliberation, they will be represented as internal reasons in the mind of the agent.” (Logical Structure of Reason pp. 115).

Total Reason

(as understood from Logical Structure of Reason pp. 131-132) A total reason must:

a) have at least one or more rational motivators that must be recognized as such by the agent
b) contain a set of effectors (efficiently bring about the satisfaction of the motivator) and or constitutors (constitute the satisfaction of the motivator).

5) Logical formal argument to be found on Logical Structure of Reason pp. 133.

6) Relation of truth to belief (pp. 136-137)

1) Key claim: To have the belief that p is true is already to have the belief that p.
2) Belief involves commitment to truth
3) Commitment has a w-t-m direction of fit i.e. upward i.e. representation is to-be immediate accepted, recognized or acknowledged.
4) Belief has a m-t-w direction of fit i.e. downward i.e. representation in mind is responsible to fit state of affairs in the world.
5) To belief is to be committed to the truth of the representational fit in one’s mind.
6) Therefore, 2) that to belief involves commitment to truth.
7) and if commitment to truth entails 3), immediate recognition of the representation in the mind, then 2) Belief entails commitment to truth and so 1) to belief p is true is to have the belief that p.

7) “The concept of rationality in decision making presupposes free choice. Indeed for rational agents free choice is both necessary and sufficient for the applicability of rationality. Free choice implies that the act is rationally assessable and rational assessability implies free choice.” (pp. 140-141). “The connection between rationality and the gap of freedom is this: rationality implies only where there is free choice, because rationality must be able to make a difference.” [note to self: especially since there are always alternate possibilities available] (pp. 142).


8) Searle’s argument is that rationality is an intrinsic internal feature in man. Without rationality, we cannot have our unique modes of cognitive and volitional capacities. Our mental capacities and faculties that function as such become support of the fact that man necessarily need to have intrinsic rational capacities (pp. 143). But to have rationality, one must have unified consciousness – apperception first. Unified Consciousness and a unified agency to act in this and that way, to initiate actions deliberate etc. thus precludes rational faculties. That one can intent and deliberate requires some pre-intentionalistic capacities i.e. Background to intepret and apply its intentional states. Through language, one is able to have abilities to intepret representations and to perform speech acts (communicate to others) and thus have potential for desire-independent reasons for action (unlike animals or chimpanzees). This is because just about every speech act we utter involves a commitment of some kind or another. Commitment and obligation pervades almost all speech acts. Every speech act can thus stand as its own commitment of oneself and something to something and can be independent of desire.

This is related to the notion of valid inference (pp. 148)

a) if p can be validly inferred from q
b) then anyone who asserts p ought not to deny q
c) that anyone who is committed to p ought to recognize his commitment to q as well.
d) [by myself note:] commitment to q is desire-independent. It is dependent on perhaps p.

9) Ontology: “Once you have the apparatus of consciousness, intentionality and a language rich engouh to perform the various types of speech acts and express various logical and temporal relations, then you already have the apparatus needed for rationality. Rationality is not an extra module or faculty. It is built into the apparatus we have described. Further, something much richer than instrumental or ends-means rationality is already built into the apparatus we have described because we have the potential, indeed the requirement of desire independent or external reasons for action.” (pp. 148) e.g. commitment to oneself in the future (prudential reasons) commitment to others (pp. 150).

9) “Once I have consciousness and the self and am able to use language, I am already committed to the existence of other consciousness and selves on par with my own.” (Some special features of Practical Reason pp. 152)

Argument That I am one self among others is an undeniable fact.
1) That there is such a thing as my conscious self make sense only if it is different from other things in the universe.
2) i.e. that there are other ‘not-me(s)’ out there.
3) I communicate with these ‘not-me(s)
4) If I communicate with them and can communicate with them then it must be presupposed by me that they are conscious agents (anthropologised) with selfhood like myself.
5) I am like them
6) I am one self among them.
Argument that self’s free act(ion) is not to be ‘caused’ by anything. This is why there can be or is ‘free action’ – that it need not and does not have antecedently sufficient psychological causal conditions.

The self does not need to be the Kantian-Korsgaard sort of self that has to spin laws and principles to instantiate or cause the self’s free act (this line of argument is that for an act to be free, one must be able to make a distinction between first-order impulses and desires and one’s own causation. This distinction is created by my self-creating universal principles since there is free will and action and man acts under the presupposition of our own free will. Hence, that there is free will and action and that we feel it and are not determined by it, we have to be the ones who create our own laws and categorical imperatives. We are then law-giving agents who act freely and who by imposing our self created principles and laws (and hence acting), create our own self.) Our acts must thus exemplify some universal principle. (from pp. 152-157)

Searle’s counter-argument: “acts can be absolutely capricious and still be free acts” “The self performs the act but not cause the act.”

10) What a speaker is committed to when he performs a speech act. A speaker is committed to the commitment of the language by which he performs the speech act (ontology of speech act in Kantian styled-argument) (pp. 159-160).

Proposition(pp159-164) : “Universality constraint gets us from egoism to strong altruism is already built into the universality of language […] No noumenal world or Kantian Categorical Imperative is necessary. All this argument requires is that we, other people, and the Beast can speak English or some other language and that we make reasonable self interested claims.” (pp. 163)

a) One has self interested attitudes about one’s relationship with others.
b) Once one makes such claims “You have a reason to help me because I am in pain and need help” then one is committed in type identitcal situations to applying universal quantifiers to the open sentence “y has a reason to help x because x is in pain and needs help,” because the use of general terms commits the speaker to the application of those terms to situations that share the general features that the initial situation had.
c) This is because, language is general.
d) There is nothing in the semantics of “I” “you” “he” etc that blocks the generality and commonality of truth conditions of what is claimed e.g. if one says “I need help” “I am in need” then others can exact the same claim and want for help too.
e) It is the generality of language that produce strong altruism.
f) When one utilizes language then, one is committed to the generality of language – the “pre-built” generality requirement. The structure of language embodies generality. Thus, “I cannot believe that they have a reason for helping me, without commiting myself to believing that in the same situation when the pronouns are reversed I am bound to recognize that I have a reason for helping them.”
g) For the same argument in Kantian jargon (pp. 159).
1. Assertions are bound by semantic categorical imperative.
2. The maxim of my assertion can be willed by me as a universal law binding on all speakers. Whatever I say, is binding on the rest and applicable by the rest, understood by the rest.
3. The maxim of my assertion is provided by the truth conditions of my proposition.
4. The truth condition depends on (or is) the object or predicate asserted in my proposition.
5. Object X has certain unique features and hence unique truth conditions to itself.
6. Objects-predicate is general and open to all.
7. So because 5. And 6. the same object-predicate I assert, others can take the same as the way I assert.

11) Proposition: There exist constitutive rules for making assertions and when a speaker asserts or says something, he invokes these rules. (pp. 173-174) One does not need any external moral principle. The commitment to truth is built into the structure of intentionality of the assertion (pp. 181).

“Recognitional rationality is enough. You simply have to recognize your own self created commitments and their logical consequences. The reason such reasons can motivate is that you created them as motivators. That is, you created a factitive entity with a propositional content that has the upward direction of fit, which is binding on you.” (pp. 181)

1. Speaker intentionally and freely asserts something.
2. By asserting something, he imposes truth conditions (conditions of satisfaction) upon whatever he said (conditions of satisfaction of the utterance itself i.e. that “it is raining”)
3. He gives whatever he says a status function – that it represents something or some state and truly or falsely.
4. By asserting something intentionally and freely, then, he is committing himself to truth and falsehood. He commits himself to the truth of his asserted proposition. The intentional imposition of conditions of satisfaction commits or obligates the speaker in various ways (pp. 174)
5. He creates commitments to whatever he asserts – propositions (‘pX’ ‘pY’ ‘pZ’ ‘pA’ ‘pB’)
6. Creation of commitment to ‘pX’ ‘pY’ ‘pZ’ ‘pA’ ‘pB’ makes these propositions asserted, i.e. ‘pX’ ‘pY’ ‘pZ’ ‘pA’ ‘pB’ desire-independent reasons for action.
7. In making an assertion, the speaker presents a proposition with the downward direction of fit (mind to world i.e. that he utters something) but in doing so, he creates a commitment which has an upward direction of fit (world to mind i.e. that how the state of things is must fit what he says or uttered-already-intend(ed)-asserted.).
8. This commitment will be satisfied and fulfilled only if the world is really the way he says it is.

[See also pp. 176]

12) Logical structure of commitment: “Commitments are factitive entities that meet our condition for reasons for action. A commitment has a propositional content and an upward direction of fit […] The commitment is satisfied only if the world changes to match the content of the commitment i.e. only if I go to the party.” (pp. 174).


13) is gives ought “The world consists of facts largely independent of us but once we start representing those facts with direction of fit, we already have norms binding on us as agents. If an animal has perceptions, those perceptions either succeed or fail in giving accurate information about the world. And the animal cannot be indifferent to truth, success and accuracy because the intentional states in question are the states of that very animal. If you have a belief, I may be indifferent to the truth or falsity of your belief, but if I have a belief, I cannot be similarly indifferent because it is my belief and the normative requirement of truth is built into the belief. From the point of view of the animal, there is no escape from normativity. The bare representation of an is gives the animal an ought” (pp. 182-183)

14) “Human ability to create through use of language a public set of commitments by performing speech acts […] Speech acts commit the speaker to the second set of conditions of satisfaction. In the case of an assertion, he is commited to the truth of the assertion. In the case of a promise he is commiteted to carrying out the act that he has promised to perform” (pp. 183)

15) “Once a motivation is created, its recognition provides an internal reason for action.” (pp 183)

16) “A statement simply is a commitment to the truth of the expressed proposition. There is no gap at all between making a statement and committing oneself to its truth. That is, there are not two independent features of the speech act, first the making of a statement and second committing myself to its truth; there is only making the statement which is eo ipso a commitment to truth.” (pp. 184)

17) Proposition: Reason can be the ground of the desire and not conversely. (pp. 189).

How does one create desire-independent reasons for action?
1. One utters X
2. Utterance has conditions of satisfaction with upward direction of fit.
3. By utterance of X [1.], one imposes conditions of satisfaction [i.e. a type of conditional obligation] on oneself on a future behaviour.
4. Obligations have upward world-to-obligation direction of fit. World has to change to match the obligation-content then only will it be fulfilled. If world don’t match obligation, obligation will not be fulfilled.
5. Obligations created are thus external motivators.
6. Obligations are epistemologically objective although they exist (and are created) only relative to attitudes of human beings that are ontologically subjective.

Why does this work?
1. Presupposition of reason.
2. 1. means that reason can be the ground of the desire that “I want to pay for it because I have an obligation to pay for it” not conversely.
3. 1. Implies that man acts based on reason, freely to choose and by intending/uttering/choosing/recognizing then, we have already manifested a desire based-on-or-created-by-reason independent of desire. (revisit how steps 1. To 6).
4. So, if we recognize the validity of an entity whose ontology is an external motivator created by us, it already gives us the reason for acting and the recognition of something as a reason for acting is already the recognition of that thing as a reason for desiring to perform the action (pp. 190).

18) Self deception is “a form of conflict avoidance by suppression of the unwelcome side. It is a form of concealment of a conflict indeed what would in some cases be an inconsistency, which if it were allowed to come to the surface would take the form of: I have overwhelming evidence that p (or perhaps, I know that p) but wish very much to believe that not p.” […]

Self deception is a way of concealing what would be a form of inconsistency or incoherence if it were allowed to surface.

In Self deception, agent has the conscious state: I believe not p He has the unconscious states: I have overwhelming evidence that p and very much want to believe that not p. Self deception thus involves irrationality and in some cases even logical inconsistency. It can exist only if one of the elements is suppressed from consciousness.

Akrasia has the form “it is best to do A and I have decided to do A, but I am voluntarily and intentionally doing B” There is no logical absurdity or onconsistency here at all though there is a conflict between inconsistent reasons for action, and the act is irrational to the extent that the agent intentionally and voluntarily acts on a reason that he believes is the wrong reason to act on.

In weak-willed actions, the self acts on a reason that that very same self judges to be not the best reason to act on, and the self acts against the very reason that the self has judged the best reason to act on.

(pp. 235-236)
Problem of akrasia is because of the gap. Argument for gap should be adumbrated.

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