2) Substance

Studies of Spinoza: On Substance

For Spinoza, in nature, there can only be one substance in Nature (God) [E1p5]. Spinoza argues that 1) [By E1D6], God is an absolutely infinite. God is a substance that consist of infinite attributes. The qualification ‘infinite’ entails that all attributes available in nature belongs to God. Also, 2) Our intellect can perceive substances, its attributes and modes [by E1d4 & E1d5] which is corroborated [by E1p1] claiming that a substance is prior in nature to its affections implying that our intellect can distinguish between the order relations of substance, attributes and modes [by E1P4]. But most crucially, it knows and can distinguish and recognize what is same [by E1P4] i.e. the attribute of or belonging to substances [by E1D4]. 3) But [also derived from E1P4], substances or its attributes and modes which belongs to it cannot be distinguished from one another by our intellect. 4) If there are two or more distinct substances, they would have distinctive attributes with distinctive affections [E1P5] for both substance and our intellect that have the power of distinguishing the same from different will detect this. But from 1), we know that there is only one God that inheres all the infinite attributes. If so, then our intellect would not be able to distinguish anything since everything is the same i.e. belonging to the same substance. Thus, if our intellect cannot distinguish anything, it would necessarily imply that there is no difference or dissimilarity and only similitude in Nature. As a corollary, it becomes axiomatic that there is only one Substance in Nature. God.

But from a Kantian perspective, it is problematic for Spinoza to assert that we can know of anything in itself or the existence of God. Through a process of logical reasoning that proceeds from a series of contingent logical premises utterly oblivious to experience and empirical reality and conditions, this proof of god is just untenable and lacking objective empirical possibility. It is insufficient to proof God or the metaphysical existence of things in themselves solely on a priori concepts and principles. Hence, although Spinoza might have reasoned that there indeed is a highest being (ens summum), what he has succeeded in doing is only achieving the idea of this prototypon in Nature but not that as he claims, a necessarily existing one. We cannot know if there is a One substance in itself. For instance, I find it problematic how Spinoza argues that a substance exists from its nature alone [E1p11] and since [from p7] a it pertains to the nature of a substance to exist, then a substance like God necessarily exists. This seems to be just a sophistical play of Reason. Moreover, Spinoza claims that we can have clear and distinct ideas or affirm the essence of this One substance God from a series of fixed and eternal things [Ethics: On Method pp. 53-54] and many particular affirmative essences or ideas [Ethics: On Method pp. 53] to God. But this method seems to assume that from fixed eternal things can be we can know God and this premise is simply syllogistic and fallacious for how can we so audaciously presume that we can infer that if we know A, we can know B? They maybe totally different and irreconcilable and we cannot assume that this inference is justifiable at all. Spinoza also claims that we can know clearly and distinctly this substance by forming a definition of it in itself. But if we cannot make justifiable inferences and in addition do not first know this substance in itself or its objective essence, then we will not be able to form a definition of this substance in itself.

It seems that for both Spinoza and Descartes, substance is something that is conceived as existing simpliciter or in itself. This is seen in E1d3 where Spinoza explicates substance as something that is conceived through itself independently of other concepts. Similarly, Descartes sees substance as “requiring no other thing for its existence” [CSM I: article 51]. Both concur that this substance is God. But for Descartes, there are other substances that exist with God’s concurrence [CSM I: article 51] e.g. corporeal substances or created thinking substances. Descartes also argues contrary to Spinoza that we can know a substance through the substance’s attributes and infer its existence [CSM article 52] whereas Spinoza argues that we cannot know the One substance from propria or properties and must know the substance in itself as it is. Spinoza seems to be contending with Descartes’s notion of substance because for Spinoza, everything flows from the one substance God or Nature that contains all the essence of created things. But for Descartes, there seems to be no such all encompassing flow. He makes the claim that every substance has a principle property that constitutes its nature [CSM article 53]. Thus, the nature of the corporeal substance entails extension, length, breadth and depth and the nature of the thinking substance entails thought [CSM article 53]. Thus, from this, Descartes argues that everything is just an idea in the mind – a mode of thinking - in our ‘thought’. Hence, for Descartes, the idea of God is just a mode of thinking and so long as we can clearly and distinctly perceive through concentrating hard [CSM article 54] and focusing on premises of deduction of God [CSM article 13], this idea of God in our thought is true. Descartes thus takes a clearly idealist stand subsuming everything including God to an idea existing metaphysically in our minds. For Spinoza however, God is the entirety of Nature – the formal essence of all things which includes the human soul. Hence, in our thought which is an attribute with soul as its mode for instance is part of the essence of Nature or this infinite being. The human soul – natura naturata is part of this entirety and dependent on God or the natura naturan. As a corollary, it follows that the idea of God in our thought is the most immediate mode of our thought. God is an infinite idea and since our soul is part of God and Nature (an infinite idea), and since it is the formal essence of all created things, then we can have an immediate idea of God. This seems to me to be opposed to Descartes’s idea of God as an external idea to be inferred from “the necessity of the concept of God” [CSM article 14]. Also, Descartes thinks of God as a substance or idea distinct from other substances which is as shown, clearly opposite to Spinoza’s idea of God as a substance that is inextricable with the all of nature.

Spinoza’s notion of God from the Theological-Political Treatise entails an intellectual knowledge and understanding of God not based on human decree which compels one to blindly accept God – by faith and fear. It entails understanding God “by the natural light of reason” [TTP 62]. It is independent from the relative form of our subjective understanding God and his will and understanding as by characteristics like “just” and “merciful”; its form presented as “narratives” for the hoi polloi; human laws. It is also free from ceremonial observances. The notion and purpose of God is thus for the universal happiness of mankind and not for subjective corrupted purposes.