From Aschheim’s: Nietzsche in the Third Reich
What then should a Nietzschean law look like? Or rather, are societal laws even possible in a Nietzschean framework?
On pages 242 of Aschheim’s paper, there is a talk about how a Nietzschean law should not be abstract codifications of immutable reasons, it should not be transcendental or affiliated with any religious structure. Instead, laws should “serve political needs” and help others to attain a volkisch life, to will to power (Machtwillens). But this seems to me to be simply contradictory if Nietzsche is seen as a philosopher who propagates the individuation of life. Insofar as the plausibility of society is even concerned as established by thinkers like Hobbes and Spinoza, for people to live together, there must be some ceding of rights, some surrendering of certain selfish-individual primal ideals and a willingness to live under a transcendental law that will have dominion over them. If so, then laws will necessarily transgress some people’s volkisch way of life. Society is not possible without laws to restraint deleterious individual centrifugal drives. Even if laws were made in a Nietzschean style to be what I conceive as neutral maxims (e.g. “live for yourself!” “like everyday is eternity!”) and not transcendental (“do not eat after 10pm!”), will such laws be empirically feasible? Can the Nietzschean laws to “create a stronger being” [pp. 242] hold a society together? If the answer is no, then a Nietzschean law is just chimerical and ideal.
From Aschheim’s: Nietzsche in the Third Reich
What are the implications of Jung’s interpretation of Nietzsche?
Jung argued for a Nietzschean conception of life as “[Germans] praise the attitude of being ready and naturally any rationalists asks, for what? That is just the point - No one knows for what. Therefore, they have no program; they have no mapped out scheme which should be fulfilled. They live for the moment.” This really rings up the question of whether a life thoroughly bereft of rationality (and lived only for the moment) is really as utopic as Nietzsche conceives of it. Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the selfsame downplays the exultation from having postulated future-goals and fulfilling them conceiving a mind set towards a future as asphyxiating the value of the present self. I think Jung pointed out a crucial aspect of a Nietzschean sort of life and the real question is will people (socialized to act as rational beings) truly enjoy such a life?
From Cixous’s Laugh of the Medusa
Are there good parallels to be drawn? Could Cixious’s view of rationality be that appropriated or adopted from Nietzsche? On pages 879, she inteprets reason as the effect, support and privileged alibis that has a phallocentric tradition. This seems every much to be Nietzsche’s account of rationality in the Genealogy of Morals as the greatest sin brought upon by Socrates and Euripides. I also found some parallels of Cixious and Marx where she speaks of women as though they are like the proletariats who are supposed to lead the coming of the revolution. Several passages show this quite clearly:
“Woman unthinks the unifying, regulating history that homogenizes and channels forces, herding contradictions into a single battlefield.” [pp. 882]
“As a militant, she is an integral part of all liberations…she will bring about a mutation in human relations, in thought, in all praxis, hers is not simply a class struggle, which she carries forward into a vaster movement… [she] will split it open, spread it out, push it forward…” [pp. 882]
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