On Theory of Knowledge

Theory of knowledge

Inasmuch as we are to call “Free will” an idea, it will be an inadequate and confused idea as a corollary of the privation of knowledge or of having inadequate knowledge. The origins of this false idea lie in the very fact that the minds of men are finite modes that can have limited knowledge of all singular things that affect us. But before I expound on how we can have a “false” idea, it is necessary to first attempt a demonstration of how is it we can even have ideas in Spinoza’s philosophy. By P7, the order and connection of ideas is same as the order and connection of things. So, by P12, the human mind will perceive everything that happens in the human body and will be composed of many ideas (our minds are composites of ideas). By P17, our mind can imagine. For instance, it can retain the images of the external bodies that once affected the human body but that does not presently exist (i.e. by P18, our minds can ‘recollect’). Yet what is cardinal here is that the human mind, its will and intellect is finite. The human mind does not know everything. For instance, by Post I, we know that Post III composes of many individuals and the human body, we know that individuals composing the human body are affected by many external bodies in many different ways. Thus, by P19, because the human body requires a great many bodies by which it can be continually regenerated and is affected by a complex matrix so many singular things, only God can have full knowledge of the body in-itself. All the human mind can know is the body as it is affected by other modes. An adequate idea of the human body and its parts can only be in God or Nature insofar as God is affected by many or all singular things. Thus, the point is that man is a finite mode who does not have adequate knowledge of external bodies and all particular singular things that are contingent, corruptible and always changing [by P31].

Hence, insofar as we consider ideas in man’s mind singularly, then there will be no clear and distinct ideas but confused and mutilated ones. But when viewed in God’s infinite intellect, all ideas related to him are true because he begets all modes and he is the only one cognizant of the whole matrix of modes in Nature. Hence, the reason why we think we have “free will” is because man as a corollary of his finite intellect is ignorant of the cause that bears upon his actions. Also, Spinoza seems to say that our false commonsensical notion of “free will” comes from the formation of ideas from signs, words and things which may or may not agree with an object and or God (For by P32, only ideas that are in God agree entirely with their objects and are hence true).

Other sources of this falsity of the idea of free will comes from the fact that philosophers like Descartes think God has given us faculties of willing and understanding and by the through experience, one can abstain from judgments (especially when the will extends further than our understanding or intellect). We also seem to have free will when we conflate ideas with ‘images’ given to our minds from external bodies. Thus, if these ideas have no proper images or are not based on our ‘understanding’ then it is assumed that they are ‘created’ by our will or us. Hence, we can affirm or negate them. Also, when we conflate words with ideas and not take ideas as ideas in God, as ideas themselves, we think we can affirm or negate what the word that signifies the idea mean thereby thinking we have ‘free will.’ Spinoza on the contrary asserts in P48 that in the mind, there is no absolute or free will but the mind is determined to will this or that by a cause (which it might not know), which is also determined by another ad infinitum. The human mind is only a determinate mode of thinking under God’s attribute of thought and hence cannot be in itself a free cause of its own actions.

Thus, the idea of “free will” is false since everything is determined in Nature. The implication of this is that there is no ‘volition,’ ‘choice,’ or ‘will’ in the finite mind (mode) and hence, no such thing as a mind acting to affirm or negate something [by P49]. An idea insofar as it is in God or Nature thereby being an ‘idea’ instantly and immanently involves the concept of ‘affirmation’. Singular volitions are hence immanent in ideas themselves. Correspondingly, the ‘will’ is synonymous with our intellect and the will and intellect are nothing but ideas and volitions.

Spinoza tries to resolve the problem of free will by claiming that insofar as ideas are related to God are ideas and they are true [by P32] and they are positive modes of thinking that do not constitute falsity [p33]. They are singular volitions that carry with them affirmation. So insofar as we think these ideas and they are in God, they are true and we are actually perceiving it. We cannot then simultaneously while perceiving the idea claim that we can or want to suspend our judgment. When we perceive, we thus simultaneously affirm. The matter of ‘will’ of judgment for instance is hence simply out of the question. Yet, this idea however seems to be very radical because it entails skepticism or the elimination of all free will of man.