Spinoza is if understood correctly is abnegating Descartes’s interpretation of substance as multiple created singular substances (thinking and corporeal) beget by God. For Descartes as analogous to the biblical bible, every substance like every man is created by God and distinct from each other. As a corollary, each substance is unique. For instance, Substance X modified and affected (and hence have a different configuration of modes) from substance Y,Z,K,N.M,P.... Thus, a real distinction exists between two or more substances [CSM, 60] as long as we clearly and distinctly perceive a distinction. Also, then each mode must be understood from the specific substance. Hence, the mode (motion) of substance X differs from Y,Z,K,N,M,P. Spinoza however is claiming that Descartes has made a metaphysical contradiction by claiming 1) that substances are independently existing then 2) asserting again that all substances exist only with the help of God’s concurrence [CSM, 51]. As such, Descartes’s whole metalphysical system of understanding substances as really distinct singular substances characterized by sets of distinctive attributes and modes and ultimately created by God is untenable.
Spinoza would argue that if substances are what that exists in itself and conceived through itself [E1d3] as what Descartes in [CSM, 51] argues, then in nature, there cannot be two substances because the definition of substance entails an ‘immanent cause’ and correspondingly, a substance cannot be produced by something else for otherwise it will not be a substance since its cause or genesis would be externalized and contingent on another cause [E1p6]. This is hence Spinoza’s major rectification of Descartes’s erroneous syllogistic idea of substance. If there is no other cause of a substance, then what explains the existence of the substance ‘God’ is its nature or essence of its existence to exist definitely [E1p7]. Thus, in nature then, there is only one substance. Also, the attributes or characteristics of this substance, God has to exist necessarily and is thus itself infinite [E1p8] and if so any modifications are just modifications of that one substance.
[If By D4,] to perceive a substance, we will look at its attributes itself (what that constitutes the essence of a substance). If so, Spinoza argues that from this, we can know that attributes inhere in the substance but we cannot as like Descartes did, infer fallaciously that these attributes inhere in multiple distinctive substances. Descartes argues that there can be many distinctive substances as we can really distinct between substances by clearly and distinctively delimit them in our thought [CSM, 60]. Spinoza argues that there is no logically sound basis for Descartes’s claim and proffers that on logical grounds, if there is only one substance, all attributes would have to inhere in it since attributes are what constitutes the essence of the substances. Thus, since all attributes have to inhere in that one substance God, it expresses the most necessity, eternity and infinity [p10]. So God exists necessarily [p11]. Moreover, there is no reason or possibility of abrogating the existence of God or to justify his nonexistence since 1) substances are conceived in itself and no other and [by p2] 2) two substances that have different attributes can have nothing in common with each other and hence cannot cause each other. Thus, other substances cannot take the existence of God away. So, God necessarily exists. But Spinoza seems to err too for that nothing takes the existence of God away does not necessarily mean that God exists. It just makes the assertion that the annulling of God’s existence is not possible by others valid.
Descartes argues that there is a clear distinction between a corporeal substance whose principle attribute is extension and a thinking substance whose attribute is thought from which all relevant modes will belong respectively. Metaphysically then, there will be many substances. But Spinoza argues that this is implausible. Substances for one are indivisible [p12]. For if divided and retain the nature of the substance, then each part would be infinite, would have its own cause and hence attribute. Metaphysically then there will be many infinite things which contradicts the notion of “infinite”. There must thus only be one substance, absolutely infinite and indivisible [p13] which Is God [p14]. All attributes and affections must hence be tied to God and cannot be distinguished apart from God.
This is against Descartes’s metaphysical claims about how there are substances (with a manifold of attributes and modes) apart from the substance of God. Thus, corporeal substances are conceptually distinct from God for they have corporeal attributes (extension) that cannot belong to God since they are divisible. But Spinoza argues firstly that substances are indivisible as afore shown [p12] and that an infinite quantity is not measurable [line example P15, II]. Thus, Spinoza is arguing that there is no real distinction between substances for there is no multiple substances but one and differences are modal difference not “real distinctions” that Descartes posits to be plausible. This is hence why he argues that “water” as a metaphysical substance is not altered or changed. When there is any corruption or generation (alterations), these are modal changes to the substance of “water” which remains metaphysically unchanged as “water”. Thus, Descartes who argues that there is a real distinction between God and corporeal substances is essentially debunked for there is only one substance and any modifications are modifications of that one substance not differences between different substance.
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