Analysis of Foucault’s Introduction to Kant’s Anthropology in the Foucouldian context of ‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’

Kant’s Anthropology is like a ‘body’ molded by a great many distinct regimes [pp. 87] and like the body, Kant’s Anthropology alike cannot understand itself. “Nothing in man – not even his body is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for understanding other men.” Something else must ground the ‘universal nature of man’ that Kant seems to assert in his flowerily written Anthropology. It is this I construe as the ‘dynamic circularity.’
Genealogy unveils the hazardous play of dominations [pp. 83]. The question of ‘how’ is what concerns me here. Enstehung is ‘emergence [pp. 83].’ It is the moment of arising. It can appear as ‘culmination point(s)’ or decisive conclusion(s) as seen in the universal nature of man in Kant’s Anthropology. But in fact, they merely [hide] the current episodes in a series of subjugations [pp. 83]. The Critique as a transcendental a priority is always battling against its unfavourable conditions [pp 84]. To ‘emerge as’ transcendental and a priori, as a species in-itself in an isolated and superior position, it has to first realize itself as a species [pp. 84]. This immediately entails a process [emphasis added] of emergence prior to it appearing as what it is: transcendental, pure, a priori, durable, uniform and simple. The Critique needs to ‘distance itself’ from the Anthropology for it claims the possibility of a priority whereas the Anthropology is a wholesale evidence of its empiricity, its site or its source of originary. It thus has to establish this ‘void’ or ‘nonplace’ between its roots, the Anthropology and itself. Yet this place for the genealogist is spectacular for it is the point or ‘place’ where one can locate this confrontational relationship and hence, discern a relationship that was made ‘invisible.’ In this pure distance, this interstice [pp. 85], we can see the Critique endlessly trying to dominate the Anthropology by subjecting or subjugating it. The Entstehung or moment of emergence thus at once signifies two things: 1) a moment or arising of the “willer” (the Critique’s will to power - the moment it utilizes and exhaust as much as it can, the possibilities given by the Welt-of-knowledge itself and step foot out of it to establish its ‘sovereignty’ and ‘uniqueness’) and 2) the subjection of the to-be dominated. For Kant’s Critique to emerge as transcendental philosophy, it has to “impose limits, inflict torments and mortifications [pp. 84]” on Anthropology. It torments and mortify Anthropology by firstly using what it gives it, by “forcefully appropriating things necessary to [its] survival [pp. 85]” the Anthropology to me in this reading, is a signification of Kant’s empirical roots (his experiences, exposure to classics, various thinkers etc from which he derives his idea of the transcendent subject). Thus, the Critique a) stems from [emphasis added] Anthropology and b) rips it of all its empiricity in it and from it to derive at a ‘pure conclusion.’ Next, 2) the Critique dominates Anthropology by inflicting torment, battle against Anthropology. It arises (transcendent; universal) above Anthropology by making Anthropology look as though [emphasis added] it is a corollary of [emphasis added] the subject’s transcendental act. This is done quite ingeniously by“imposing” the tripartite structural- division upon the Anthropology. Hence, Anthropology appears to have [emphasis added] the mimicry categories and divisions that is quite synonymous to the Critique. But this appearance is the very result of the Critique’s act of domination its Entstehung (emergence). In other words, 1) there exists a relationship between the Critique and Anthropology 2) the Critique needs Anthropology (Critique’s empiricity) to arise to its grand position. The relationship of domination is not found in a historical time or place [pp. 85] but in rituals, in meticulous procedures that impose rights and obligations [pp. 85] on Anthropology. Once the tripartite divisions or rules or transcendental laws are laid, it becomes an automated-engine itself. It stages the stage for its own “meticulously repeated scenes of violence [pp. 85].” Recall, the Critique itself emerges from the real Welt-of-knowledge as Kant wills himself to power. It is his interpretation of the Welt. But once Kant lays down these laws or rules, it is for Foucault as for Nietzsche, “an appearance” that has taken the identity of the truth-itself. This is why Foucault writes:

“Humanity installs each of its violences in a system of rules and thus proceeds from domination to domination.” [pp. 85]

“The nature of these rules allows violence to be inflicted on violence and the resurgence of new forces that are sufficiently strong to dominate those in power.” [pp. 85]

The transcendental law that Kant sets down becomes the stage of repeated meticulously repeated scenes of violence [pp. 85]. ‘Violence’ as a term used to signify domination against others or other things which cloaks them in Kant’s own veil (veil of his own will to power) and deprives others of willing themselves into their real existence i.e. understanding and deriving their own interpretations of the Welt. Thus, this is for Nietzsche as for Foucault, not a good thing. Moreover, Foucault goes on to say that “rules are empty in themselves, violent and unfinalized; they are impersonal and can be bent to any purpose [pp. 85-86].” Thus, once Kant sets down the transcendental law, we, as a conglomeration of ‘others’ or ‘other people’ can use it and think it to be [emphasis added] the real truth although this is merely, Kant’s truth and Kant’s own will. His act of violence, upon us. Thus, for Foucault, to see truth, one must first be able to seize these rules, pervert them, invert their meaning and redirect them against those who initially imposed them (this is the role of the Genealogist). One must be able to “control this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules [emphasis added][pp. 86].” Only through one’s very own interpretation of the Welt, is one able to make one’s own rules (not relying on others) and hence subvert Kant’s rule.
What Kant has done is thus, that he has interpreted “a system of rules [of the welt] which in itself has no meaning and impose a direction, to bend it to his [own] will, to force its participation (or point of view) in a different game (the Kantian game) [pp. 86].” Progress or the development of history is thus interpreted by Foucault as a “series of interpretations” that perhaps overcome and undermine one another. Hence, to dispel this false truism of the Kantian transcendence, we cannot ‘retrace history’ through time but must look at and for and analyze this “non-place” this “pure distance” where this violence is perpetrated.
The role of the genealogist is thus to dispel the Kunst the illusion of a Kantian plenitude and meaningful phenomenon. There thus exists a radical discontinuity, pure space between Anthropology and the Critique through which true relations of tensions are played out. 1) Through perpetual and continual repetitions or the repeat of violence upon Anthropology, the Critique gains its transcendence. Its transcendence is rooted and dependent upon Anthropology by always overcoming it and distancing itself from it. This is also important because the Anthropology is a site that displays all of Kant’s empirical links and affiliations to the Welt or context he lives in and is influenced by. To establish the subject as a priori and sovereign, what has just been said must be effaced completely. The pure distance must be maintained. But also, 2) that Anthropology has its the universal and objectively-knowing voice proclaiming this and that to be truth and can make such “universal claims” of what really is good or human is because it depends on the Critique. It depends on this continual violence and dominance inflicted upon it (tripartite divisions established and ‘given’ by the transcendental subject) so as to appear as a sovereign epistemological structure of its own apart from the Welt-of-knowledge. Yet, it has to distance itself from “its own truth,” its source, the Critique, which is Kant’s will to power that its truth, is itself, Kant’s subjective truth for any recognition of this will subvert Anthropology’s “universality.” There thus exist this very dynamic circularity which is extremely hard to point out in isolation between the Critique and Anthropology. Each inflicts violence upon each other and seeks to triumph each other. The Critique of Anthropology to attain transcendence and the Anthropology of the Critique to sustain its status of its scientific universality.

Anthropology is always the site of perversion and inversion of the power of the Critique for it is evidence of a panoply of empirical influences the Critique is dependent on but denies. Thus, the Critique continually impose its divisions upon the Anthropology to sustain its transcendence and (or but) also, continually distance itself from it for it is the Critique’s source of peril.

Important takeaways:

Although this seems contrary to what Foucault wants to say, for me, most importantly, this whole circular display wants to tell us that 1) every mensch’s own interpretations of the Welt is his own. He takes from the Welt that contains infinite possibilities and interprets it for his own. The subject still reigns supreme in the end or does it? 2) We must thus beware of anyone’s claim of “objectivity” and “universality” for its truism is always someone’s will to power and its “naturalness” and “continuity” always entails one’s interpretations. Also, 3) there will always exist something like Anthropology ‘the body’ or site where there can be an unravelling and or dismantling of the truth of, in this case, the “Critique” 4) Any interpretation of the social world must entail a person’s will to truth and power.