NE III, Chapter 1
Voluntary Act
An act is voluntary when at the moment of action, the act is carried out by the man himself [1110a: 16] i.e. the moving principle is in the man himself [1110a: 17] and that he chooses to do it with cognizance of the particular circumstances and context of the prospective act [111a: 22-23].
Thus, common notions of objects having a forcing and compelling power [1110b: 10] to make us do things are erroneous. It entails a moving principle outside the actor himself forcing him to act in a certain way [1110b: 18] as a corollary of certain external circumstances [1110b: 14]. But it is fallacious to claim all noble acts to ourselves as done voluntarily and base acts as being forced [1110b: 17] and the person contributes nothing [1110a: 18] because the act is carried out by the actor whose the moving principle is in himself [1110a: 17].
Also, the same actor should be responsible for all actions base or noble and not just the noble and not the base [1110b: 14]. Since both noble and base acts are derived from the same cause of appetite, anger or pleasure, it would be illogical that only the latter (base act) is attributed with irresponsibility and the former (noble act) with responsibility [1111a: 29]. Moreover, appetite and anger can engender voluntary action [1111a: 24] since the actor in the act, chooses to act and acts in accordance with anger and appetite. We can hence, choose to be angry at certain things and appetitive towards others [1111a: 31-32]. The moving principle is thus in the actor [1110b: 10] and so, appetite and anger belongs to the category of voluntary acts because we can do voluntarily, acts that are stemming from appetite and anger [1111a: 28]. Similarly, desires are voluntary because we can desire and act voluntarily towards our desires [1111a: 30].
Furthermore, Aristotle argues that irrational passions like appetites and anger are not any less human than reason [1111b]. If actions based on reason are a matter of voluntary and rational choice, appetites can also be based on voluntary and rational choice [1111b]. Thus, again, actions stemming from appetites and anger are voluntary acts.
Involuntary Act
Several factors would qualify an act to be involuntary. Firstly, it is when the moving principle is outside the actor and he does not choose the act in itself [1110a: 19]. Secondly, when the action done by reason of ignorance produces pain and regret [1110b: 19]. Thirdly, regret and pain depends on pity and pardon [1111a: 1]. Acts committed out of ignorance of particulars or of the specific circumstances of action and objects concerned [1111a] are ones that deserve pity and pardon because the actor is ignorant of his actions in the specific circumstance [1111a: 1-2]. So an involuntary act is one committed out of the ignorance of particulars and not out of mistaken purposes [1110b: 31] or ignorance or the universal [1110b: 33]. For the latter, men are blamed [1110b: 34] not pitied or pardoned as involuntary acts would evoke [1111a: 1-2]. For the former, he is wicked [1110b: 33] not ignorant at the specific context as actors who are involuntarily are.
More specifically put, it is when a man acts involuntarily with regards to what he is doing [1111a: 9] at the particular context or specific circumstance [1111a]. This is exemplified by the analogy of something that should not be said being slipped in a conversation [1111a: 9]. Other things that qualify as involuntary includes ignorance of what an actor is doing, to what end, how he is doing it, or to whom he is acting on [1111a: 3-6]. Yet, although these are involuntary acts, it is only applicable to the mad men because the sane is assumed to have to some extent, a clarity of the mind enough to know the above.
Not-voluntary Act
An action that is not-voluntary differs from voluntary and involuntary. In retrospect, a voluntary agent is one who chooses to act in a certain way [1110a: 19]. An involuntary agent is one who acts ignorantly and regrets [1110b: 19]. An act is not-voluntary classifies as such when the actor did not choose to act in a certain way yet by reason of ignorance did and does not feel vexed or remorseful about his action [1110b: 18-24]. This is exemplified best by the instance of the drunk man [1110b: 26] who did not choose to act in such a manner but is motivated by his dearth of consciousness and clarity of the mind. Thus, he did not act voluntarily i.e. not by choice and acted in ignorance as a corollary of his drunkened state of mind.
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