On explaining NE 1105a35-b4

It seems that this brief exposition is conferring upon us the idea that arts and virtues are vastly dissimilar [1105a: 27]. Products of arts are good in themselves [1105a: 28]. So, it is enough that they have certain character [1105a: 29] like ‘beauty’ or ‘elegance’ and by attaining the ‘beauty’ of an art, one will be a good artist. However, virtues are not immanent and realizable in themselves. Moral virtues, Aristotle claims, comes as a result of habit [1103a: 17] and none of it arises in us by nature [1103a: 21]. Virtue is an act by which we get by exercising them [1107a: 32]. As a corollary, virtues are proffered to be twofold. Virtues have its characteristics or dispositions like ‘temperateness’ [1105a: 29], ‘truthfulness’ [1108a: 19], ‘ready-wittedness’ [1108a: 24], ‘good-temperedness’ [1108a: 6], ‘liberality’ [1107b: 9], and ‘pride’ [1107b: 23]. But to be virtuous, it is not sufficient to act in a ‘just’ or ‘temperate’ manner to be virtuous like the arts where you can paint beautifully and be a good artist. This is because; acts of virtue also have themselves a certain character [1105a: 28-29]. Thus, if agents carry out virtuous actions, agents have to also possess certain conditions necessitated by characteristics of virtuous acts [1105a: 30]. Aristotle proposes that these conditions include having knowledge of virtues, choosing virtuous acts for their own sakes, and proceeding from a firm and unchangeable character [1105a: 32-33].

Aristotle in this very condensed passage also seems to be suggesting that just knowledge of virtues and their means of attaining them is insufficient [1105b: 1]. A virtuous agent must indeed act upon the three conditions exactly as they are. As Aristotle posits, it is only by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and temperate acts that the temperate man is produced. This is because virtue is twofold. One has to know virtue, and act.

Virtue is a state of character concerned with choice [1106b: 36] lying in a mean relative to us[1107a] and one has to act exactly aiming at the intermediate [1106b: 15], at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people and in the right way [1106b: 21-23]. Above all, one has to also act on the basis of the three conditions which are cardinal [1105b: 3] for reasons given afore.