Spinoza’s Affects & Pity

In Spinoza’s philosophical system, it seems most likely that there can be no space for pity for in his structure of affects, pity has already been laid out as “a sadness, accompanied by the idea of an evil which has happened to another whom we imagine to be like us.” [TEIII: Of the Affects XVIII]. Pity is thus evil because it begets sadness that diminishes our ability to act to persevere our being (since [by TEIII: D3] sadness is an affect that restrains our power of acting and causes our essence to transit from a greater to lesser perfection). Moreover, [by TEIII P21, 22], in the circumstance that one imagines what he loves to be affected with sadness, one will also be affected by sadness. This is so since if we imagine a thing like us to be affected with sadness, our imagination will express an affection of our body like this affect and we will correspondingly experience the affection – sadness. Yet, Spinoza is adamant that we will strive to affirm only affects related to joy and deny the imagination of affects associated with sadness because man’s essence lies in striving to persevere in his own being. Hence, pity is evil and useless to man. Correspondingly, man who lives according to guidance will strive not to be affected by pity. He states blatantly in TEIV P30 that whatever that is evil is contrary to our nature insofar as it diminishes or restrains our power of acting. As a result, whatever that affects us with pity we will strive to of whatever that can destroy the thing’s existence. So clearly, Spinoza thinks pity as a reprehensible affect that should be absolutely liquidated.

Yet, even though Spinoza castigates pity, his philosophical system still does not seem to be an automaton inhumane world of selfish modes and minds. In fact, he appeals repeatedly to how man under the guidance of reason will desire for other man the virtue that he wants for himself - which is to act accordingly with the guidance of reason to strive for the understanding of Nature or God. In acting by one’s own laws of nature for one’s own best advantage, one will want to avert all evils and do things good for human nature i.e. good for each man and he will most essentially want to strive to act, rejoice and live well to his own greatest perfection. As a corollary, one who lives according to the guidance of reason will desire for the other too insofar as the man will be joyous (hence leading to a greater perfection and power of acting) upon seeing the betterment of others or the good that one loves. Altruism in the purest sense only for others is impossible since no virtue precedes the virtue of striving for oneself. Conceiving anything prior to the essence of ourself is absurd [by TEIV P21] although man can still act towards others in a way that benefits them (albeit not purely in objective for them). Hence on many counts, Spinoza’s notion of pity parallels with Hobbes’s utilitarian notion of pity – giving the old man aid to relief one’s own pain in considering the miserable condition (or sadness in Spinoza’s terms) in one’s mind. Both Spinoza and Hobbes hinge their arguments from a common substratum being the idea of oneself which precedes all else. Spinoza specifically thinks that man is only morally virtuous when one has the desire to do good generated in us by the very fact of living according to the guidance of reason to strive to persevere in his being. Only by doing so can man experience self-esteem which is a joy born of his consideration of his own empowerment and self-acting. Hence, both Spinoza and Hobbes seem to undergird their ideas of pity from the individual.

Insofar as pity is concerned especially as a form of sadness diminishing and restraining our body’s capacity to act, I think Spinoza’s fierce pillory of it is justifiable as it is averse to man’s own strivings and well-being for it makes no sense to me for anyone to languish in pity and further fetter one’s own ability to act. By understanding nature and God, I suppose we understand ourselves as finite modes with a finite life-span All life I think should involve a positive willing of oneself into existence. Pity then, “a practice of nihilism,” [Nietzsche: The Antichrist pp. 573] “…that multiplies misery and conserves all that is miserable… persuading men into nothingness,” “…that negates life” is hostile towards life. Thus, anything that stultifies man’s thinking and encumber (or give him excuses to) his own empowerment to act is reprehensible and to this extent, I think Spinoza’s denigration of this affect is justifiable. No healthy and productive person society can flourish based on pity because pity is an affect that gives people the right of way to not overcome the manifold challenges that everyone will face in life.